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THE ENFORCEMENT OF PERSONAL LIABILITY
ON MORTGAGE DEBTS IN NEW YORK*
MILTON R. FRIEDMAN t
THE traditional remedy of a mortgagee is foreclosure. Under the
common law, a mortgage was a conveyance of title defeasible on pay-
ment of the debt. On default the mortgagee, as legal owner, took
possession or brought ejectment at law against the mortgagor. But
from an early period the mortgagor could go into equity and stay the
legal action so as to permit subsequent redemption. Consequently, the
mortgagee came to initiate his proceeding in equity by praying for an
order directing the mortgagor to redeem within a specified time or be
foreclosed of all interest in the premises.' Thus to relieve the mortgagor
from forfeiture,' chancery, along with the evolution of this procedure
of strict foreclosure,' developed the doctrine of equity of redemption
and carefully surrounded it with safeguards. 4
* The validity and effect of assumption of mortgage debts in New York has recently
been discussed by the author in the JOURNAL in The Creation and Effect of Personal Lia-
bility on Mortgage Debts in New York (1940) 50 YALE L. J. 224. This article will
discuss the remedies of the mortgagee before and after the emergency legislation of 1933.
t M ember of the New York and Connecticut bars.
1. There is said to be an unreported case permitting redemption after sixteen years
-a practice hardly designed for free alienation of property. Brabner-Smith, Economic
Aspects of the Deficiency Judjnent (1934) 20 VA. L. REV. 719, 721.
2. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Camp, 124 N. J. Eq. 403, 407-08, 1 A. (2d) 425, 427-
28 (1938).
3. Barson v. Mulligan, 191 N. Y. 306, 313-15, 84 N. E. 75, 78, 16 L. R. A. (N. s,)
151 (1908); Moulton v. Cornish, 138 N. Y. 133, 140-41, 33 N. E. 842, 843-44, 20 L, R. A.
370 (1893); Holmes v. Gravenhorst, 238 App. Div. 313, 314-15, 263 N. Y. Supp. 738,
740-41 (2d Dep't 1933), rev'd, 263 N. Y. 148, 188 N. E. 285, 91 A. L. R. 1230, 1236
(1933); Young v. Vail, 29 N. M. 324, 369-71, 222 Pac. 912, 924, 34 A. L. R. 980, 1015
(1924).
4. Since 1830 the mortgagee's remedy of ejectment has been barred in New York
by statute (now Civil Practice Act § 991) which cannot be avoided by contract. See
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Liberdar Holding Co., 74 F. (2d) 50, 53 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). A
mortgagee may no longer have possession prior to foreclosure without the owner's con-
sent. Herrmann v. Cabinet Land Co., 217 N. Y. 526, 112 N. E. 476 (1916). Waiver of
the equity of redemption is forbidden, and executory contracts to convey to the mort-
gagee in lieu of foreclosure are unenforceable as against public policy. See Verity v.
Metropolis Land Co., 248 App. Div. 748, 288 N. Y. Supp. 625 (2d Dep't 1936), aff'd,
274 N. Y. 624, 10 N. E. (2d) 582 (1937); but cf. 2 JONES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928)
§ 878, n. 47, and § 881, n. 90. Dealings between mortgagor and mortgagee are subject
to scrutiny by equity. See Odell v. Montross, 68 N. Y. 499, 504 (1877) ; 2 JONES, Op. Cit.
supra, at §§ 878-81; 1 WILTSIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES (5th ed. 1939) §§ 244-45.
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Early foreclosure procedures were in rem and no money judgments
were sought or obtained.' With this common law background Chancellor
Kent, in the early New York case of Dunklcy v. Tau Buren,0 concluded
that equity had no jurisdiction to enter a deficiency judgment in fcorv-
closure. This was an exception to the general practice of equity, on
assuminfg jurisdiction, to make a complete determination of all issues.
legal and equitable. But principally because of Kent's prestige, American
courts have assumed since the Dznkley case that deficiency judgments
were creatures of statute alone. Later, strict foreclosure was supplanted
in New -York by foreclosure by sale, a method deemed fairer t-n the
ground that a public sale was the truest test of value: If the prisceced,;
of sale were less than the mortgage debt, the mortgagee recovered a
judgment for the deficiency, while any surplus was payable to the
mortgagor.
8
REMEDIES OF THE MORTGAGEE BEFORE Tr-E EMUERGENCY LEGISLATIOx
Deficiency Judgments. Prior to the emergency legislation of 19331
a mortgagee could by statute recover a deficiency judgment in fore-
closure against his mortgagor and any person liable on the debtO if
the court had jurisdiction in personam'0 and the judgment directing
the sale adjudicated the liability of the party to be charged.1' Judgment
5. See Monaghan v. 'May, 242 App. Div. 64, 66, 273 N. Y. Supp. 475, 478 (2d Dep't
1934); Young v. Vail, 29 N. 'M. 324, 369-71, 222 Pac. 912, 924, 34 A. L. R. 9F9, 1015
(1924).
6. 3 Johns. Ch. 330 (N. Y. 1818).
7. See Rutherford Realty Co. v. Cook, 198 N. Y. 29, 33, q0 N. E. 1112, 1113 (1910);
Reichert v. Stilwell, 172 N. Y. 83, 89, 64 N. E. 790, 792 (1902); Jamaica Say. Banlz
v. M. S. Investing Co., 274 N. Y. 215, 218, 8 N. E. (2d) 493, 112 A. L. R. ,145, 1492
(1937) ; M1onaghan v. 'May, 242 App. Div. 64, 66, 273 N. Y. Supp. 475, 478 (24 Dep't
1934), and see the elaborate discussion in Young v. Vail, 29 N. M. 324, 22 Pac. 912,
34 A. L. R. 980, 1015 (1924).
8. Lansing v. Goelet, 9 Cow. 346, 356, 357 (N. Y. 1827); Sears, Ruebuck & Co.
v. Camp, 124 N. J. Eq. 403, 407-0, 1 A. (2d) 425, 428 (1938) ; cf. Frank v. Davis, 135 N.
Y. 275, 279, 31 N. E. 1100, 1101 (1892) ; National City Bank v. Gelfert, 284 N. Y. 13,
20, 29 N. E. (2d) 449, 452-53 (1940), 130 A. L. R. 1472, 1492 (1941), rcvd, 313 U. S.
221 (1941) ; 3 JoxEts, MoRTGAGEs (Sth ed. 1928) § 2010.
Foreclosure by sale is said to be the common American remedy. P,rabner-Smith,
loc. cit. supra note 1. The mortgagee's remedies in the various states are cataloguod
in 3 JoNrEs, M ORTGAGFS (Sth ed. 1928) § 1690 ot scq. The remedies in England are di,-
cussed in Turner, The English Mortgage of Land as Security (1934) 20 VA. L. Riw.
729.
9. N. . C. P. A. §§ 1079 (7), 1QW.
10. Heilbrunn v. Kellog, 253 App. Div. 753, 1 N. Y. S. (21) 193 (24 Dep't 1937),
aff'd, 279 N. Y. 773, 18 N. E. (2d) 861 (1939); Pacek v. Ferrar, 258 App. Div. 772, 14
N. 1. S. (2d) 814 (4th Dep't 1939).
11. Bankers Trust Co. v. 1 East 88th St. Co., 283 N. Y. 3f9, 28 N. F (2,4 875
(1940); Wager v. Link, 134 N. Y. 122, 128, 31 N. H. 213, 215 1&2 ; ee Sprague
v. Jones, 9 Paige 395 (N. Y. 1842) (amendment of judgment).
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of foreclosure and sale was final for some purposes and interlocutory
for others. It was a final order for purposes of appeal,12 but inter-
locutory as to the amount of the obligor's liability, which was not fixed
until the entry of a money judgment. 3 Not until then did execution
issue.14 If the referee's report of sale showed a deficit, the clerk of
the court docketed a deficiency judgment without application "to the
court or notice to the obligor."0 Execution issued immediately; confirma-
tion was neither necessary nor usual'( and no further order was re-
quired.'7 The act of the clerk was purely ministerial,' in pursuance of
12. Emigrant Indust. Say. Bank v. Van Bokkelen, 269 N. Y. 110, 199 N. E. 23
(1935). The judgment of foreclosure and sale is a final determination of the rights of the
parties in the premises on all matters within the scope of the pleadings. Matter of Es-
tate of Stilwell, 139 N. Y. 338, 34 N. E. 777 (1893). The adjudication of liability is
immune from collateral attack. Butterly v. Maribert Realty Corp., 234 App. Div. 424,
255 N. Y. Supp. 321 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd, 260 N. Y. 554, 184 N. E. 89 (1932) ; Tni-
kelman v. 415 East 12th St. Corp., 251 App. Div. 377, 296 N. Y. Supp. 870 (1st Dep't
1937). Fraud in obtaining the judgment may be raised subsequently. Slote v. Caq-
cade Holding Corp., 276 N. Y. 239, 11 N. E. (2d) 894 (1937); Byrnes v. Owen, 2,13
N. Y. 211, 153 N. E. 51 (1926); Garlasco v. Smith, 250 App. Div. 534, 294 N. Y. Supp.
772 (1st Dep't 1937), aff'd, 276 N. Y. 666, 13 N. E. (2d) 53 (1938). The right to an
accounting may also be raised subsequently. Kohl v. First Trust Co., 255 App. Div.
123, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 84 (4th Dep't 1938) ; see Bennett v. Austin, 81 N. Y. 308 (1880)
(junior mortgagee in possession, using rents to acquire title in senior foreclosure, holds
title in trust for mortgagor). A third person, not a party to the foreclosure, may not
take advantage of the adjudication. St. John v. Fowler, 229 N. Y. 270, 128 N. E. 199
(1920). The judgment is interlocutory in that the right of redemption survives until
the sale and until then inferior lienors may sell on execution. Nutt v. Cuining, 155
N. Y. 309, 313, 49 N. E. 880, 881 (1898); Barnard v. Onderdonk, 98 N. Y. 158, 166
(1885). The auction sale terminates the right of redemption and the owner may not
prevent the purchaser's completion of the sale by tender during the interim. Brown v.
Frost, 10 Paige 243 (N. Y. 1843).
13. McCarthy v. Graham, Paige 480 (N. Y. 1840) ; Emigrant Indust. Say. Bank
v. Van Bokkelen, 269 N. Y. 110, 115, 199 N. E. 23, 25 (1935) ; see 3 JoNns, M ,otoAG, S
(8th ed. 1928) §§ 2206, 2220.
14. French v. French, 107 App. Div. 107, 94 N. Y. Supp, 1026 (4th Dep't 1905),
appeal dismissed, 185 N. Y. 532, 77 N. E. 1187 (1906) ; see 3 JoNEs, MORTOAGES (8th ed.
1928) §2012.
15. Bondy v. Aronson & List Realties, Inc., 227 App. Div. 136, 237 N. Y. Supp. 444
(4th Dep't 1929); Hawley v. Whalen, 64 Hun 550, 19 N. Y. Supp. 521 (5th Dep't
1892).
16. Bondy v. Aronson & List Realties, Inc., 227 App. Div. 136, 237 N. Y. Supp.
444 (4th Dep't 1929); Moore v. Shaw, 15 Hun 428 (N. Y. 1st Dep't 1878), appeal dis-
missed, 77 N. Y. 512 (1879) ; Metropolitan Say. Bank v. Feigenblatt, N. Y. L. J., Oct.
26, 1936, p. 1369, col. 7 (Sup. Ct.); see Syracuse Trust Co. v. Corey, 167 Misc. 506,
509 et seq., 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 349, 352-53 et seq. (Sup. Ct. 1938).
17. Taylor v. Derrick, 64 Hun 636, 19 N. Y. Supp. 785 (Sup. Ct. 1892).
18. Morris v. Morange, 38 N.Y. 172 (1868) ; Moore v. Shaw, 15 Hun 428 (N. Y.
1st Dep't 1878), appeal dismissed, 77 N. Y. 512 (1879).
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the judgment of foreclosure and sale, and apparently not a final order
for purposes of appeal. 9
Since determination of the deficiency judgment was automatic, protec-
tion of the mortgagor depended on adequacy of price obtained at the fore-
closure sale. But the foreclosure sale, although subject to vacation on
various grounds of unfairness,- could not be set aside for inadequacy
of price alone"' unless it was so great as to "shock the conscience" of
the court.22 Nor did the mortgagee's resale of the premises at a profit
reduce the deficiency judgment. -3 While the failure of judicial sales to
attract bidders had previously been recognized, 4 it was the depression
19. Himmelman v. 540 West 146th Street, Inc., 244 N. Y. 540, 155 N. E. 8M (1926).
20. King v. Platt, 37 N. Y. 155 (1867); Wright v. CaprareIla, 205 App. Div. 559,
199 N. Y. Supp. 864 (2d Dep't 1923); Lincoln Trust Co. v. Fullaytar, 193 App. Div.
530, 190 N. Y. Supp. 630 (1st Dep't 1921), appeal dismissed, 232 N. Y. 600, 134 X. E.
588 (1922); Purdy v. Wilkins, 95 Misc. 706. 160 N. Y. Supp. 17 (Sup. Ct. 191i); Col-
lier v. Whipple, 13 Wend. 224 (N. Y. 1834) ; Jackson v. Crafts, 1s Johns. Ch. 110 (N.
Y. 1820) ; Corwith v. Barry, 69 Hun 113 (N. Y. 1893) ; see Emigrant Indust. Say. Bank
i% Van Bokkelen, 269 N. Y. 110, 115, 199 N. E. 23, 25 (1935) ; Lansing v. Goelet, 9 Cow.
346, 402 (N. Y. 182-7); Brown v. Frost, 10 Paige 243, 246 (N. Y. 1843); Federal Title
& Mtge. Guar. Co. v. Lowenstein, 113 N. J. Eq. 200, 203, 166 At. 538, 540 (Ch. 1933) ;
Stanley, Effect of Economic Depression on Foreclosure (1939) 27 Ky. L. J. 365, 310.
An order of resale, when appropriate, is often granted only on assurance of a higher price
and security for expenses. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. B. & M. T. Co., 119 N. Y. 15,
23, 23 N. E. 173, 174 (1890); Wright v. Caprarella, supra; Collins v. Dunston, 59 App.
Div. 626, 69 N. Y. Supp. 1132 (4th Dep't 1901); German-American Bank v. Dorthy,
39 App. Div. 166, 57 N. Y. Supp. 172 (4th Dep't 1899); Halliday v. Greenke-Halliday
Co., N. Y. L. J., June 2, 1932, p. 3094, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.) ; Syracuse Trust Co. v. Corey,
167 Misc. 506, 513, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 349, 355-56 (Sup. Ci 1938); see (1933) 33 ",L. L.
REv. 744, 745, n. 9; Note (1933) 85 A. L. R. 1480, 1481 ct seq.
21. Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U. S. 180 (1885); see Matter of Superintendent of
Banks, 207 N. Y. 11, 16, 100 N. E. 42n, 429 (1912) ; Tripp v. Cook, 26 Wend. 143, 153
(N. Y. 1841); Durfee & Doddridge, Redemption from Foreclosure Satc (1925) 23
Micn. L. Rm. 825, 833; Stanley, supra note 20, at 381 et seq.; Cohen and Simpson, The
Sale Technique in Corporate Reorganization (1939) 16 N. Y. U. L. Q. R. 341, 345
et seq.; (1934) 19 Cor-q L. Q. 316, 317 et seq.; (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 960, 961; (1929)
27 Mic. L. REv. 822; Note (1920) 8 A. L. R. 1001, 1002.
22. Chapman v. Boetcher, 27 Hun 606 (N. Y. 1882); Ames v. Lock,,ood, 13 How.
Pr. 555 (N. Y. 1856) ; see Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 393, 446,
88 A. L. R. 1481, 1519 (1933), and cases cited sttpra notes 20 and 21; but cf. cases
cited infra note 25.
23. Haines v. Twelfth Ward Bank, 162 App. Div. 164, 147 N. Y. Supp. 254 (1st
Dep't 1914), aff'd, 220 N. Y. 751, 116 N. E. 1049 (1917); Schultz v. Mead, 8 N. Y.
Supp. 663 (1890), aff'd, 128 N. Y. 680, 29 N. E. 149 (1891) ; see 3 Jo:Ns, Mo-aGAGEs (Sth
ed. 1928) § 2206; de Funiak, Right to a Deficiency Judgment (1939) 27 Ky. L. J. 410;
Note (1938) 117 A. L. R. 863.
24. Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 21, at 832-33; HArmor: or Cobutssioi.ns oN;
UxiroRmi LAWS (1922) 275; cf. CrAVATH. So.m LEGAL PHA Es or r FIxNA:-
ING, REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION (1930) 204.
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that fully revealed the complete breakdown of the foreclosure machinery20
as a protection against unconscionable deficiency judgments, and led
the New York lower courts, with some division in their ranks, to make
sporadic but ineffectual efforts at amelioration.2" But, in general, the
established premise that a public sale brought the full value of the prop-
erty left the courts powerless to deprive the mortgagee of his statutory
rights.
27
Action on the Bond. Before the emergency legislation, a mortgagee
could disregard the mortgage and his right to foreclose and recover a
judgment for the mortgage debt against the mortgagor 2 8 (despite a
25. Twenty-eight of thirty-one parcels sold at foreclosure in New Jersey on the
same day brought $100 each. See Federal Title & Mtge. Guar. Co. v. Lowenstein, 113
N. J. Eq. 200, 202, 166 At. 538, 539 (Ch. 1933), (1934) 19 CoRN. L. Q. 316. See Chein-
ical Bank & Trust Co. v. Schumann Associates, Inc., 150 Misc. 221, 268 N. Y. Supp.
674 (Sup. Ct. 1934) ; Brabner-Smith, supra note 1, at 722-24. New York courts refused
to vacate deficiency judgments recovered on the basis of such bids. Irving Trust Co. v.
Edson, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 20, 1933, p. 1033, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.); Railroad Cooperative Bldg,
& Loan Ass'n v. Cocks, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 10, 1937, p. 720, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.).
26. Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. v. Ellda Corp., 147 Misc. 374, 265 N. Y. Supp. 115
(Sup. Ct. 1933) (sale postponed until assurance of normal bidding); Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co. v. Adler, N. Y. L. J., July 29, 1933, p. 343, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.) (sale
postponed until end of legislative session) ; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. H. & J. Guttag Corp.,
N. Y. L. J., Aug. 1, 1933, p. 370, col. 1 (ibid.); McCall v. Maxwell Park Corp., N. Y.
L. J., Aug. 1, 1933, p. 370, col. 2 (Sup Ct.) (ibid.); Brown v. Wardsview Realties
Corp., N. Y. L. J., Aug. 3, 1933, p. 395, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.) (ibid.); Bank of Manhattan
Trust Co. v. 2166 Broadway Corp., N. Y. L. J., July 7, 1933, p. 67, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.)
(sale adjourned one month); Tishka v. Wisnieska, N. Y. L. J., July 10, 1933, p. 103,
col. 6 (County Ct.) (sale adjourned six months); Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. 2727
Broadway Co., N. Y. L. J., Jan. 27, 1934, p. 441, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.) (sale adjourned nine
weeks); Farmers & Mechanics Say. Bank v. Eagle Bldg. Co., 151 Misc. 249, 271 N. Y.
Supp. 306 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (fixes upset price) ; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Johar Realty Co.,
N. Y. L. J., July 22, 1933, p. 259, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.) (mortgagee delayed sale thirteen
months; value of property to be applied on debt) ; Strochak v. Glass Paper Making Sup-
plies Co., N. Y. L. J., May 9, .1933, p. 2794, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.); Id., May 10, 1933, p.
2818, col. 6 (Sup. Ct.) (stays sale), rev'd, 239 App. Div. 312, 267 .N. Y. Supp. 282 (1st
Dep't 1933) ; Dime Say. Bank v. Danley Realty Co., N. Y. L. J., June 27, 1933, p. 3839,
col. 1 (Sup. Ct.) (refuses to stay sale) ; Loma Holding Co. v. Cripple Bush Realty Co.,
147 Misc. 655, 265 N. Y. Supp. 125 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (refuses to stay action on bond);
see (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 960; (1934) 34 COL. L. Ray. 706, 707, n. 13; Gilligan & Stern,
Protecting the Rights of Mortgagors, N. Y. L. J., Aug. 29, 1933, p. 688, col. 1; Id. Aug.
30, 1933, p. 702, col. 1; Notes (1934) 90 A. L. R. 1330, (1933) 82 A. L. R. 976; Perl-
man, Mortgage Deficiency Jvdgments During An Economic Depression (1934) 20 VA.
L. Rav. 771, 805 et seq. Cf. note 152 infra.
27. But it should be noted that judicial reluctance to vacate foreclosure sales had at
least the merit of lending stability to judicial titles.
28. General Investment Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 200 App. Div. 794,
193 N. Y. Supp. 903 (1st Dep't 1922), aff'd, 235 N. Y. 133, 139 N. E. 216 (1923); see
Kress v. Central Trust Co., 246 App. Div. 76, 78, 283 N. Y. Supp. 467, 469 (4th Dep't
1935), aff'd, 272 N. Y. 629, 5 N. E. (2d) 365 (1936) ; Schenectady Say. Bank v. Ashton,
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conveyance) ,29 an assuming grantee,30 a guarantor or against all of
them.31 This right was unaffected by destruction of the mortgage lien
through paramount foreclosure,3 2 condemnation33 or tax sale.34
Before the enactment of statutes making available a deficiency judg-
ment in a foreclosure proceeding, the mortgagee could proceed at law
on the bond and foreclose his mortgage in equity concurrently.03 This
procedure, however, was changed by a series of statutes consolidating
the mortgagee's remedies into two complete"0 but separate actions: he
might either proceed on the bond or sue to foreclose. To avoid double
litigation and costs the consolidation statutes thus sought to confine all
issues to one of two actions and require where possible the joinder
of all persons liable on the mortgage.37 Foreclosure became a plenary
proceeding -in rem to enforce the lien and in personam for a resulting
deficiency, the complaint being deemed to state but a single cause of
action." All persons liable for the debt could thus be joined in fore-
120 Mlisc. 26S, 198 N. Y. Supp. 198 (Sup. Ct. 1923), re'd, 205 App. Div. 781, 783, 260
N. Y. Supp. 245, 247 (3d Dep't 1923).
29. See Johnson v. Zink, 51 N. Y. 333, 336 (1873) ; Marshall Y. Davies, 78 N. Y.
414, 421 (1879) ; Roch. Say. Bank v. Stoeltzen & Tappen, Inc., 176 Misc. 140, 26 N. Y.
S. (2d) 713 (Sup. Ct 1941).
30. Burr v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178 (1861). For the qualifications of the mortgagee's
rights against an assuming grantee see Friedman, The Creation and Eftce of Personal
Liability on Mortgage Debts i New Yorl- (1940) 50 Y.-ax L. J. 224, 226 c seq.
31. See Shipman . Niles, 75 App. Div. 451, 453-54, 78 N. Y. Supp. 440, 441 (1st
Dep't 1902), aff'd, 177 N. Y. 527, 69 N. E. 1132 (1903) ; Roch. Say. Bank v. Stoeltzen &
Tappen, Inc., 176 Misc. 140, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 713 (Sup. Ct 1941).
32. Frank v. Davis, 135 N. Y. 275, 31 N. E. 1100 (1S92); Sautter v. Frick, 229
App. Div. 345, 242 N. Y. Supp. 369 (4th Dep't 1930), aff'd, 256 N. Y. 535, 177 X. E.
129 (1931) ; Weisel v. Hagdahl Realty Co., 241 App. Div. 314, 271 N. Y. Supp. 629 (2d
Dep't 1934), 48 HAav. L. REv. 126.
33. See Hill v. Wine, 35 App. Div. 520, 523, 54 N. Y. Supp. 892, 894 (1st Dep't
1898).
34. McRae v. Hummel, 250 App. Div. 873, 295 N. Y. Supp. 202 (2d Dep't 1937).
35. Dunkley v. Van Buren, 3 Johns. Ch. 330 (N. Y. 1818) ; Jones v. Conde, 6 Johns.
Ch. 77 (N. Y. 1822); see Jamaica Say. Bank v. I. S. Investing Co., 274 N. Y. 215,
218, 8 N. E. (2d) 493, 494, 112 A. L. R. 1485, 1492 (1937); Palmer v. Harris, 100 Ill.
276, 280 (1881). This was said to be common practice. Engle v. Underhill, 3 Edw. Ch.
250, 251 (N. Y. 1838).
36. But see National City Bank v. Gelfert, 284 N. Y. 13, 22, 29 N. E. (2d) 449,
453 (1940).
37. Reichert v. Stilwell, 172 N. Y. 83, 64 N. E. 790 (1902); Grosvenor v. Day, 1
Clarke Ch. 109 (N. Y. 1839) ; Robert v. Kidansky, 111 App. Div. 475, 97 N. Y. Supp.
913 (1st Dep't 1906), aff'd, 188 N. Y. 638, 81 N.E. 1174 (1907) ; Darmstadt v. Manson,
144 App. Div. 249, 128 N.Y. Supp. 992 (2d Dep't 1911) ; Carlin v. Lindvert, 175 App.
Div. 940, 161 N. Y. Supp. 1120 (2d Dep't 1916).
38. The deficiency judgment is deemed incidental to the foreclosure rather than as
stating a separate cause. See Jamaica Say. Bank v. M. S. Investing Co., 274 X. Y. 215,
219, 8 N. E. (2d) 493, 494, 112 A. L. R. 1485, 1489, 1498 (1937) ; Reichert v. Stilwell,
172 N. Y. 83, 88, 64 N. E. 790, 792 (1902).
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closure3" where a money judgment would be rendered for the residue
of the debt left after the sale4" and the priority of liability and rights-
over settled among the obligors.4 As an alternative to foreclosure the
mortgagee might maintain an action on the bond, joining all parties
personally liable and, after recovery of judgment, levying on the free
assets of the obligors.42 The two remedies could not, however, be pursued
concurrently.43 Nor, apparently, could a mortgagee voluntarily discon-
tinue one type of suit for the purpose of instituting the other." After
recovery of judgment in an action on the bond, for example, no fore-
closure was maintainable until execution was returned unsatisfied .4  Con-
versely, the institution of foreclosure, where a deficiency judgment was
available, debarred the mortgagee from an action on the bond before
or after the decree.40 Civil Practice Act Section 1078 codified this
39. N. Y. C. P. A. § 1079 (7).
40. N. Y. C. P. A. §§ 1083, 1083-a.
41. See Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 91 N. Y. 392, 397 (1883); Albany Exchange Say.
Bank v. Winne, 168 Misc. 853, 856, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 699, 702-03 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; cf.
Farnham v. Mallory, 5 Abb. Pr. N. S. 380 (N. Y. 1867).
42. Compare p. 408 infra.
43. Dudley v. Congregation of St. Francis, 138 N. Y. 451, 34 N. E. 281 (1893)
White v. Wielandt, 259 App. Div. 676, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 560 (2d Dep't 1940), aff'd,
30 N. E. (2d) 725 (N. Y. 1941); Matter of Whalen, 136 Misc. 296, 240 N. Y. Snpp.
587 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (barred from filing involuntary petition in bankruptcy against oblig-
or during pendency of foreclosure); see 3 JoNEs, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 2206;
Tice v. Annin, 2 Johns. Ch. 125 (N. Y. 1816). Contra: Rossbach v. Aurora Holding
Corp., 252 App. Div. 842, 300 N. Y. Supp. 601 (lst Dep't 1937) (no opinion); Steitz
v. Geiger, N. Y. L. J., July 29, 1940, p. 226, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.).
44. Engle v. Underhill, 3 Edw. Ch. 250 (N. Y. 1838) ; but cf. Suydam v. Bartle, 9
Paige 294 (N. Y. 1841) (permitted on conditions).
45. N. Y. C. P. A. § 1077. Dudley v. Congregation of St. Francis, 138 N. Y. 451,
457-58, 34 N. E. 281, 282 (1893); Grosvenor v. Day, 1 Clarke Ch. 109 (N. Y. 1839);
Guilford v. Crandall, 69 Hun 414, 23 N. Y. Supp. 465 (3d Dep't 1893); Note (1939)
121 A. L. R. 917, 926, 928-29; Scheidell v. Llewellyn Realty Co., 177 N. Y. Supp. 529
(Sup. Ct. 1918) (applied to foreclosure for part of debt theretofore reduced to judg-
ment); cf. Williamson v. Champlin, 8 Paige 70 (N. Y. 1839). During foreclosure no
action on the bond is maintainable without cogent reasons. Matter of Moore, 81 Hun 389
(N. Y. 1894). The statute is inapplicable to the subsequent foreclosure of a supplemen-
tal mortgage. Reichert v. Stilwell, 172 N. Y. 83, 64 N. E. 790 (1902); see Ferraro v.
Marillard Builders, Inc., 227 App. Div. 448, 238 N. Y. Supp. 188 (2d Dep't 1929) (pre-
vious action for waste no action on mortgage debt). Cf. note 47 infra.
46. White v. Wielandt, 259 App. Div. 676, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 560 (1st Dep't 1940),
aff'd, 30 N. E. (2d) 725 (N. Y. 1941); cf. Honeyman v. Hanan, 275 N. Y. 382, 392, 9
N. E. (2d) 970, 974 (1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U. S. 375 (1937); but cf. President
& Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Callister Bros., 175 Misc. 421, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 623,
aft'd, 260 App. Div. 880, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 826 (2d Dep't 1940) (mortgage partial se-
curity for notes); Schaaf v. O'Brien, 8 Daly 181 (N. Y. Comm. PI. 1878). But see
Rossbach v. Aurora Holding Corp., 252 App. Div. 842, 300 N. Y. Supp. 601 (1st Dep't
1937) (permits joinder of cause of action for foreclosure with causes for interest and
taxes; no opinion) ; Stitz v. Geiger, N. Y. L. J., July 29, 1940, p. 226, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.)
(ibid.).
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limitation by preventing the maintenance of any action for the debt after
foreclosure without leave of court." While the granting of leave was
discretionary, the limits of discretion were fairly well marked. It was only
granted in special circumstances as, for instance, against a non-resident
who had knowledge of the foreclosure and an opportunity to protect his
interest at the sale4" or where there was another valid excuse for non-
joinder of an obligor.49 It was denied if the obligor could have been
served"° or, if served, no deficiency judgment was sought in the fore-
closure,5 i.e., where there was no inducement for the obligor to protect
his interest at the sale. Again, it was denied in case of some under-
47. N.Y. C. P. A. § 1078. See Duport, Right to Sue on the Bond Before, During and
After Foreclosure, N. Y. L. J., May 17, 1932, p. 2748, col. 1, May 18, 1932, p. 2772,
col. 1. Application for leave should be on notice where the respondent is available for
service. Cooper Co. v. Naumberg, 154 App. Div. 225, 138 N. Y. Supp. 1005 (2d Dep't
1912). But it may be given nuc pro tunc in the law action. McKernan %. Robinson,
84 N. Y. 105 (1881) ; Matter of Corin, 217 App. Div. 809, 217 N. Y. Supp. 903 (3d
Dep't 1926) ; Earl v. David, 20 Hun 527 (N. Y. 1820). After reduction of the mortgage
debt to judgment no leave is required in actions to enforce the judgment. Prisco &
Soveris, Inc. v. Service Bond & Mtge Co., 230 App. Div. 713, 242 N. Y. Supp. S97 (2d
Dep't 1930) (setting aside a fraudulent transfer); cf. cases supra note 45; Matter of
Gray, N. Y. L. J., May 8, 1937, p. 2327, col. 7 (Sup. Ct) (judgment against executor
binds legatee by privity; leave unnecessary to enforce judgment at least with respect to
executor's undistributed assets); but see Rowley v. Nellis, 41 Misc. 315, 84 N. Y. Supp.
841 (Sup. Ct. 1903) (no privity between executor and heir); Burnham v. Burnham,
27 Misc. 106 (Sup. Ct. 1899), aff'd. 46 App. Div. 513 (1900), aff'd, 165 N. Y. 659 (1901) ;
Platt v. Platt, 105 N. Y. 483 (1887) (judgment against executor not even prima fade
evidence of debt against heir or devisee).
A claim against a mortgagor's estate was permitted without leave after a foreclosure
against an absentee mortgagor. In; re Oster's Estate, 8 N.Y. S. (2d) 249 (Surr. Ct.
1938), aff'd, 258 App. Div. 930, 16 N.Y. S. (2d) 612 (4th Dep't 1939). Despite the
possibly proper basis for an application here the dispensation with leave is out of line
with cases cited supra note 46 and infra note 51.
48. Matter of Corin, 217 App. Div. S09, 217 N. Y. Supp. 903 (3d Dep't 1926).
49. McKernan v. Robinson, 84 N. Y. 105 (1881); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Grabowit-
zky, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 23, 1936, p. 811, col. 3 (Sup. Ct).
50. Robert v. Kidansky, 111 App. Div. 475, 97 N. Y. Supp. 913 (1st Dep't 1906),
aff'&d 188 N. Y. 638, S1 N. E. 1174 (1907); Matter of Byrne, 81 App. Div. 74, 80 N.Y.
Supp. 977 (1st Dep't 1903) ; Matter of Collins, 17 Hun 2S9 (N. Y. 1879) ; see Hochstein
v. Schlanger, 150 App. Div. 124, 134 N.Y. Supp. 704 (1st Dep't 1912), aff'd, 203 N.Y.
513, 101 N. E. 1105 (1913) ; but see Campbell v. Smith, 71 N. Y. 26 (1877).
51. Carlin v. Lindveit, 175 App. Div. 940, 161 N. Y. Supp. 1120 (2d Dep't 1916);
Matter of Steiner v. Day, 161 App. Div. 742, 147 N. Y. Supp. 200 (2d Dep't 1914) ; Mor-
rison v. Slater, 128 App. Div. 467, 112 N. Y. Supp. 855 (1st Dep't 1903); Matter of
Marshall, 53 App. Div. 136, 65 N. Y. Supp. 760 (1st Dept 1900) ; Rowley v. Nellis, 41
Misc. 315, 84 N. Y. Supp. 841 (Sup. Ct. 1903) ; but cf. Matter of McLaughlin v. Durr,
76 App. Div. 75, 78 N. Y. Supp. 798 (1st Dep't 1902) (supervening paramount fore-
closure); Lockwood v. Fawcett, 17 Hun 146 (N. Y. 1879) (foreclosure complaint asked
deficiency judgment but no adjudication of liability; may not enforce payment of defi-
ciency out of realty devised by mortgagor) ; but cf. note 47 stipra.
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standing not to seek a deficiency judgment,5 2 or in case of laches" a or
delay whereby the party to be charged lost a right-over against a person
primarily liable." It has never been denied solely on the ground of an
inadequate bid at foreclosure, but neither this factor nor other equities
escaped consideration in the cases denying leaveY5
Death of the Obligor. As a result of statutes overruling the common
law, the death of the mortgagor effected substantial changes in the reme-
dies of the mortgagee. Under common law, all charges against realty for
which a decedent was liable, including mortgages, became debts of his
estate and payable by the personal representative unless the will directed
otherwise." The heir or devisee took the property, as against the repre-
sentative, free and clear of the mortgage. But popular belief that the rule
was otherwise, i.e., that the mortgaged premises were primarily liable
for the payment of the debt, defeated the intentions of testators so
frequently that the legislature enacted a statute early in the nineteenth
century (now Real Property Law Section 250) reversing the common
52. Scofield v. Doscher, 72 N. Y. 491 (1878); Matter of Marshall, 53 App. Div.
136, 65 N. Y. Supp. 760 (1st Dep't 1900); cf. Wetherell v. Kelly, 195 App. Div. 227,
187 N. Y. Supp. 43 (2d Dep't 1921).
53. Stehl v. Uris, 210 App. Div. 444, 206 N. Y. Supp. 296 (1st Dep't 1924); U. S.
Life Ins. Co. v. Poillon, 55 Hun 606, 7 N. Y. Supp. 834 (Sup. Ct. 1889).
54. Matter of Collins, 17 Hun 289 (N. Y. 1879).
55. Leave was unnecessary under Section 1078 after foreclosure by advertisement if
a money judgment was unavailable [see Bush v. Robbins, 23 Wkly. Dig. 405 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct. 1886); Cape Cod Say. Bank v. Patton, N. Y. L. J., Apr. 11, 1939, p, 1659,
col. 1 (Sup. Ct.)], or in bringing an action based upon a previous deficiency judg-
ment [see Schultz v. Mead, 8 N. Y. Supp 663 (Sup. Ct. 1890), aff'd, 128 N. Y. 680,
29 N. E. 149 (1891) ; cf. note 47 supra]. It is applicable only to a holder of the mort-
gage and does not affect the right of an obligor who has paid the debt to reimburse-
ment against a primary or co-obligor. As to a primary obligor, see Comstock v.
Drohan, 71 N. Y. 9 (1877) ; cf. Hyde v. Miller, 45 App. Div. 396, 60 N. Y. Supp. 974
(4th Dep't 1899), aff'd, 168 N. Y. 590, 60 N. E. 1113 (1901). As to a co-obligor, see
Weed v. Calkins, 24 Hun 582 (N. Y. 1881).
56. See Matter of Burrows, 283 N. Y. 540, 544, 29 N. E. (2d) 77, 79 (1940);
Matter of Noyes, 3 Dem. 369, 370 (N. Y. 1885) ; Notes (1906) 3 L. R. A. (N.s.)
898-99; (1920) 5 A. L. R. 488, 497; (1931) 72 A. L. R. 709; (1939) 120 A. L. R. 577.
One reason advanced for the doctrine is that the personalty of the testator was saved
from depletion by the giving of the mortgage [see Matter of Fogarty, 165 Misc. 78, 79,
300 N. Y. Supp. 231, 234 (Surr. Ct. 1937)], a reason of doubtful validity when applied
to purchase money mortgages where the personal estate of the testator received no addi-
tion thereby. See CLEAVELAND, HEWITT & CLARK, PROBATE LAW & PRAcrTic or CONN.
(1915) § 460; 5 A. L. R. supra, at 505. The rule is unaffected by a devise expressly
subject to the mortgage, which is deemed to describe the premises, or of the testator's
interest in the premises, which is deemed to refer to a dower interest surviving the devise
3 L. R. A. (N.s.) supra, at 902. It is not applied, however, where it would defeat spe-
cific bequests. Rice v. Harbeson, 63 N. Y. 493 (1875) ; see 3 L. R. A. (N.S.) supra, at
902.
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law rule." This statute required the heir or devisee of property mort-
gaged by the decedent, in the absence of contrary testamentary directions,
to "satisfy and discharge such mortgage out of his own property," with-
out resorting to the representative. The statute was held to cover mort-
gages assumed as well as executed by the decedent."5 And it was not over-
ruled by a general testamentary direction to pay debts."0
Section 250 was limited in its terms to the relations between heir
or devisee and the general estate, but it was nevertheless extended by
construction to the mortgagee."0 Though not intended to deprive the
mortgagee of any part of his debt, it was held to make the mortgaged
premises primarily liable for the mortgage debt and to limit the liability
of the representative and distributees of the estate to a deficiency judg-
ment. By judicial legislation, therefore, the mortgagee was required first
to foreclose and then to claim against the general estate only for the
deficiency.6" The mortgagee could not waive his lien on the property
and claim for the full amount of his debt against the representative;c
-
57. 1 N. Y. REV. STAT. (2d ed. 1836) p. 740, § 4. See Matter of Burrows, 2,3 N. Y.
540, 544, 29 N. E. (2d) 77, 79 (1940).
58. Matter of Fogarty, 165 Misc. 78, 300 N. Y. Supp. 231 (Surr. Ct. 1937); Wicks
v. Carmichael, 172 Misc. 924, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 395 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
59. Meyer v. Cahen, 111 N. Y. 270, 18 N. E. 852 (1882) ; In re Dell's Estate, 154
Misc. 216, 276 N. Y. Supp. 960 (Surr. Ct. 1935). The delivery of collateral security to
the mortgagee by the testator during his lifetime overrules the statute pro tanto. Matter
of Vicinus, 159 Misc. 903, 290 N. Y. Supp. 20 (Surr. Ct. 1936). A comparable English
statute is construed generally to similar effect. 2 CoorE, MofRTGcGErS (8th ed. 1912) 792-
800. As originally enacted, it included no charges other than mortgages, and the general
estate, therefore, remained liable for all other debts affecting the mortgaged premises.
See Wright v. Holbrook, 32 N. Y. 587 (1S'65) (vendor's lien); Matter of Babcocc:, 115
N. Y. 450, 22 N. E. 263 (1889) (taxes) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 3 Bradf. 54 (N. Y. 1854)
(liens for improvements); Lamport v. Beeman, 34 Barb. Ch. 239 (N. Y. 1851); Matter
of Hun, 144 N. Y. 472, 476, 39 N. E. 376, 377 (1895). But in 1937 the statute Vas
amended to make the heir or devisee take subject to liens for unpaid purchase price or
other charges. N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 75; Matter of Pinkmey, 170 Misc. 645, 12 N. Y. S.
(2d) 69, aff'd, 257 App. Div. 862, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 824 (2d Dep't 1939) (real estate
taxes).
60. See Matter of Weissman, 140 Misc. 360, 361, 250 N. Y. Supp. 500, 501 (Surr.
Ct. 1931).
61. Hauselt v. Patterson, 124 N. Y. 349, 26 N. E. 937 (1891); Matter of Rosen-
baum, 157 Misc. 316, 283 N. Y. Supp. 519 (Surr. CL 1935); Matter of Perins, 1"
Misc. 593, 204 N. Y. Supp. 667 (Surr. Ct. 1924); see cases cited in Doyle . Graves,
172 Misc. 8, 840, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 554, 556 (Sup. Ct. 1939); but cf. Roosevelt V.
Carpenter, 28 Barb. Ch. 426 (N. Y. 1858).
62. Matter of Burrows, 167 Misc. 1, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 449 (Surr. Ct. 1938), secord
appeal sub now. Matter of Nichols, 258 App. Div. 807, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 956 (2d Dep't
1939), rev'd on otlier grounds sub non. Matter of Burrows, 283 N. Y. 540, 29 X. .
(2d) 77 (1940); but see Prime v. Nichols, 252 App. Div. 446, 447, 299 N. Y. Supp. 629,
630 (2d Dep't 1937); Roosevelt v. Carpenter, 28 Barb. CI. 426, 429-30 (N. Y. 1858). A
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Section 250, on the other hand, created no personal liability in the heir
or devisee for the debt."8 Thus the mortgagee could recover a judgment
against neither for principal or for interest. 4 For interest accruing before
the obligor's death, the mortgagee could recover directly against the
representative,65 but for interest accruing subsequently it was necessary
first to resort to foreclosure and only charge the representative with any
resulting deficiency. 8 Enacted for the purpose of preventing an heir
or devisee from taking property, as against the representative, free and
clear of the mortgage, 7 Section 250 thus construed had the further
effect of marshalling the assets by postponing and qualifying the mort-
gagee's rights on the bond."8 The mortgagee, however, was afforded
some protection against dissemination of assets properly applicable to
payment of his deficiency by a statute empowering the surrogate, on the
mortgagee's application as a contingent creditor, to direct reservation
literal reading of the statute does not preclude a claim against the estate where the prop-
erty was sold during the mortgagor's lifetime because it refers only to property which
"descends to an heir, or passes to a devisee." The temper of the decisions,' however,
makes it questionable whether such construction would be upheld. Cf. Matter of Reilly,
175 Misc. 597, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 213 (Surr. Ct. 1940), (1941) 54 HARV. L. Rav. 1067;
Matter of Bernard, 176 Misc. 132, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 767 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
63. Hauselt v. Patterson, 124 N. Y. 349, 26 N. E. 937 (1891) (but heir liable for
value of aliened lands) ; Doyle v. Graves, 172 Misc. 838, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 554 (Sup.
Ct. 1939). This should be distinguished, however, from the right of an estate creditor to
follow assets into the hands of beneficiaries. See note 69 infra.
64. Bank of N. Y. Trust Co. v. Marsh, N. Y. L. J., May 29, 1940, p. 2449, col. 2
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 260 App. Div. 1013, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 1C07 (1st Dep't
1940), aff'd, 285 N. Y. 813, 35 N. E. (2d) 197 (1941) ; Doyle v. Graves, 172 Misc. 838,
16 N. Y. S. (2d) 554 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
65. New Rochelle Trust Co. v. Hinton, 256 App. Div. 724, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 707
(2d Dep't 1939), aff'g, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 861 (Sup. Ct. 1938). The representative is cred-
ited for such payments on his accounting. Matter of Soper, 224 App. Div. 431, 231 N. Y.
Supp. 333 (4th Dep't 1928); Matter of Rosenstein, 152 Misc. 777, 782, 274 N. Y. Supp.
126, 131-32 (Surr. Ct. 1934). Where the mortgaged premises are left in trust interest
accrued to death is payable from interest while interest thereafter accruing is payable
from income. Matter of Stiles, 64 Misc. 658, 120 N. Y. Supp. 714 (Surr. Ct. 1909).
66. Levy v. Comfort, 13 N.Y. S. (2d) 845 (County Ct. 1939), aff'd, 257 App. Div.
1037, 13 N.Y. S. (2d) 847 (4th Dep't 1939) ; see cases cited supra note 64. A repre-
sentative who pays such interest receives no credit therefor on his accounting. Matter of
Soper, 224 App. Div. 431, 231 N. Y. Supp. 333 (4th Dep't 1928) ; Matter of Watson, 101
App. Div. 550, 92 N.Y. Supp. 195 (1st Dep't 1905) ; Matter of Hackert, 171 Misc. 139,
11 N. Y. S. (2d) 987 (Surr. Ct. 1939) ; Matter of Fogarty, 165 Misc. 78, 300 N. Y. Supp.
231 (Surr. Ct. 1937) ; Matter of Roberts, 72 Misc. 625, 132 N. Y. Supp. 396 (Surr. Ct.
1911).
67. See Wright v. Holbrook, 32 N. Y. 587, 589-90 (1865) ; Roosevelt v. Carpenter,
28 Barb. Ch. 426, 429 (N. Y. 1858).
68. See dissenting opinion in New Rochelle Trust Co. v. Hinton, 256 App. Div. 724,
726, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 707, 709 (2d Dep't 1939).
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of assets deemed sufficient to pay a deficiency judgment when finally
determined. 9
EMERGENCY AND SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION
Deficiency Judgments. Beginning in 1933 the remedies of the mort-
gagee were substantially changed by a series of state statutes. At that
69. N. Y. Sum. CT. AcT § 207. Matter of Burrows, 2S3 N. Y. 540, 29 N. E. (2d)
77 (1940). The Burrows case implies that the reservation must le equal to the full prin-
cipal of the mortgage debt. Before this decision the surr,.tgatev were eC.treniely reluc-
tant to reserve assets indefinitely for the protection of a mortgagee's contingent claim.
Generally, they found the value of the mortgaged premises high enough to warrant diV-
tribution of other assets. See Matter of Reilly, 175 Misc. 597, 601-02, t94, 24 N. Y. S.
(2d) 213, 217-18, 220 (Surr. Ct. 1940), (1941) 54 HAUv. L. RnV. 1067, 101. Since the
Burrows decision, however, an amendment to N. Y. Svrr. Cr. Acr §207 (N. Y. Lav.-.
1941, c. 86) authorizes the surrogate to appraise the value of the creditor's security and
reserve assets equal to the deficit. The amendment probably reinstates the practice of
the lower courts.
The mortgagee may require an accounting of the representative before distribution.
Rositzke v. Meyer, 176 App. Div. 193, 162 N. Y. Supp. 613 (21 Dep't 1916) ; and may
join him in foreclosure for the purpose of recovering a deficiency judgment [Glacius v.
Fogel, 88 N. Y. 434 (1882) ; Kings Cty. Trust Co. v. Derx, 237 App. Div. 543, 261 N.
Y. Supp. 909 (2d Dep't 1933)], which thereupon becomes a debt payable out of the
estate with others of the same class. But if the representative has theretofore made a
proper distribution, he is not subject to account or surcharge for the benefit of the mort-
gagee. Matter of Fransinetti, 175 Misc. 52, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 718 (Surr. Ct. 1940), aff'd,
260 App. Div. 997, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 988 (1st Dep't 1940); Matter of Dusenbery v.
Bragg, 241 App. Div. 553, 273 N. Y. Supp. 1 (4th Dep't 1934); In re Coston, 172 Misc.
494, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 870 (Surr. Ct. 1939). But the mortgagee may, nevertheless, in
a creditor's action, follow estate assets into the hands of the beneficiaries, a right inle-
pendent of statute, but regulated under N. Y. DEC. EsL. LAw § 170 et seq. Colgan v.
Dunne, 50 Hun 443, 3 N. Y. Supp. 309 (1888) ; Brooklyn Say. Bank v. Joseph Wechsler
Estate, 259 N. Y. 9, 180 N. E. 752 (1932). This involves practical difficulties because
of the rules of marshalling assets or rather, in this case, of marshalling liability [see
Lawrence v. Grout, 112 App. Div. 241, 78 N. Y. Supp. -79 (1st Dep't 1906)], the pos-
sible location of beneficiaries beyond the jurisdiction, and the fragmentation of assets
effected by distribution. Often, distribution occurs before the mortgagee can reduce his
claim to judgment, as, e.g., where the mortgage is not due at the mortgagor's death,
where the mortgagor sold the premises during his lifetime, or where for other reasons
the representative may be unaware of the claim or the mortgagee of the mortgagor's
death.
Presumably, the purpose of recovering a deficiency judgment against the representa-
tive, after distribution of the estate, is to predicate a subsequent creditor's action. Mat-
ter of Dusenbery v. Bragg, supra; Matter of Perkins, 122 Misc. 593, 204 N. Y. Supp.
667 (Surr. Ct 1924). The mortgagee's right to recover a deficiency judgment against
estate beneficiaries in a foreclosure action is apparently in conflict. The right was upheld
in Olmstead v. Latimer, 158 N. Y. 313, 53 N. E. 5 (1899); Collins' Petition, 6 Abb.
N. C. 227 (N. Y. 1879) ; First Nat. Bank v. Goodman, 173 Misc. 562, 18 N. Y. S. (2d)
562 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (and cases there cited); but denied in Leonard v. Morris, 9 Paige
90 (N. Y. 1841) ; Buckley v. Beaver, 99 Misc. 643, U36 N. Y. Supp. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
Cf. 1 W ILTSIE, MORTGAGE FomEaLosun.s (5th ed. 1939) §§ 416, 417. These cases hardly
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time the New York Legislature, like many others,70 recognized the exist-
ence of a "serious public emergency . . . abnormal disruption in econ-
omic and financial processes, the abnormal deflation of real property
values and the curtailment of income by unemployment. . . . "71 Its
response was an elaborate group of statutes designed to cope with the
situation in two general ways. First, foreclosure 72 and actions on the
bond 73 for non-payment of principal were barred if interest and taxes
were paid-a phase irrelevant to this article. Secondly, Civil Practice
Act Section 1083-a sought to bar recovery of money judgments in
excessive amounts by limiting deficiency judgments to the excess of the
mortgage debt over the fair value of the property regardless of the
actual proceeds of the foreclosure sale.1 4 To prevent the mortgagee from
circumventing Section 1083-a by disregarding the mortgage and suing
for the debt, Section 1083-b was enacted to permit the obligor to offset
the fair value of the property in an action brought on the bond." The
discuss the problems involved. One is whether beneficiaries subject to jurisdiction may
be joined in foreclosure and their proportionate liabilities fixed, or, if not, whether the
mortgagee must obtain special leave in the foreclosure court to bring a subsequent cred-
itor's action, %vhich may involve independent procedural difficulties. See Lawrence v.
Grout, supra. Another problem is whether a judgment creditor's action will lie without
an adjudication of liability in the foreclosure, which raises the further question of privity
between representative and beneficiary. See note 47 supra. In any event, completion of
the foreclosure or ultimate recovery of a money judgment, or probably both, are delayed.
National Say. Bank v. National Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 176 Misc. 1057, 29 N.
Y. S. (2d) 840 (Sup. Ct. 1941), permits joinder of the distributee in foreclosure, denies
the need for an accounting, and indicates the possibility that liability may be determined
in the foreclosure alone. But this seems practical only when distribution is complete and
the beneficiaries subject to jurisdiction. Cf. Pink v. Keiber, N. Y. L. J., May 8, 1941,
p. 2072, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.). This may account for the difference in the cases. If the con-
solidation statutes require special leave before subsequent proceedings will lie against
the beneficiaries [cf. note 47 supra], then refusal to permit joinder of beneficiaries in
the foreclosure action begins a pyramid of procedural difficulties for the mortgagee.
70. See 128 C. C. H. Fed. Bank Serv. (Loan & Finance Unit) 17501 (cumulative
chart of legislation); 3 WILTsIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES (5th ed. 1929) § 977;
(1934) 19 CoRxV. L. Q. 316, 322 et seq.; Keaton, Deficiency Judgments and Decrees
(1934) 20 VA. L. REv. 743, 765 et seq.; Perlman, Mortgage Deficiency Judgments Dur-
ing an Economic Depression (1934) 20 VA. L. REv. 771-805.
71. N. Y. LAws 1933, c. 794, § 1.
72. N. Y. C. P. A § 1077-a.
73. N. Y. C. P. A. § 1077-b.
74. Thus, where the property on foreclosure is sold to a third party for a lesser
amount than the fair value as subsequently determined by the court, the mortgagee must
accept as full satisfaction an amount less than the contractual obligation. To avoid the
risk of this loss the mortgagee may be compelled to buy in at the sale. But the signifi-
cance of this result is minimized by the rarity of outside purchasers. See notes 24 and
25 supra.
75. One method of evasion, i.e., by a contract by the mortgagor to bid the amount of
the mortgage debt at foreclosure sale, was upheld. Hellawell v. Baer, N. Y. L. J., July
20, 1936, p. 194, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.); but it misfired when the mortgagee's damages for
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legislation was restricted to mortgages made before July 1, 1932,7 in
the belief that emergency laws would be unnecessary to protect mort-
gages made thereafter in a low market.77 July 1, 1934, was originally
fixed as the end of the emergency,78 but by successive reenactments the
period has been extended, the present one expiring July 1, 1943. In
1938, however, the deficiency judgment provisions were incorporated into
the permanent law.
Hurried enactment of these statutes deprived them of precise drafts-
manship and raised questions subsequently solved only in part by sporadic
amendment and construction. Section 1083-a provided that, on applica-
tion for a deficiency judgment, the obligor be credited with the sale
price or the fair value of the property, whichever was h-igher. As
standards for determining the fair value of the property, the Act pre-
scribed "fair and reasonable market value of the mortgaged premises"
as of the date of the sale "or such nearest earlier date as there shall have
been any market value thereof." Since the legislation was enacted at
a time when the great preponderance of all sales was judicial or other-
wise forced, the legislature recognized, for the purpose of determining
fair value, the possible necessity of reverting to an earlier period when
there was less exclusively a buyer's market. Some courts sought to make
current appraisals by scrutinizing the usual elements of value. 0 Some
sought to fix value by the projection of two supposititious creatures-
the "willing seller" and the "willing buyer."8 0o But most courts, influ-
enced by language of the Court of Appeals in its opinion determining
the validity of the statute,' found no market in the legislative sense
as of the period of the foreclosure and reverted to 1930 or 1931,P often
breach were reduced by the value of the property. Id., 249 App. Div. 641, 292 N. 1.
Supp. 85 (2d Dep't 1936). See generally Wheeler & Durfee, Evasion of Moratoria by
Prosecution of Personal Remedies (1935) 33 MicH. L. Ray. 1196.
76. N. Y. C. P. A. § 1077-g; Chase Nat. Bank v. Guardian Realties, Inc., 233 N. Y.
350, 365, 28 N. E. (2d) 868, 873 (1940) ; Sheepshead Bay Bungalow Co. v. 'Mandel &
Co., 244 App. Div. 811, 279 N. Y. Supp. 556 (2d Dep't 1935).
77. Decker v. Dutcher, 247 App. Div. 689, 691, 289 N. Y. Supp. 553, 555 (3d Dep't
1936).
78. N. Y. C. P. A § 1077-g, (as originally enacted, N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 793).
79. See (1935) 35 Co. L. REv. 1314.
80. Berkshire Life Ins. Co. v. Van Voorhis, 245 App. Div. 592, 2M3 X. Y. Supp. 95
(4th Dep't 1935); President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Premier Bldg. Co., 247
App. Div. 297, 285 N. Y. Supp. 806 (2d Dep't 1936).
81. "There being no market for real estate of any kind, and the banks refusing to
loan money on the best of real estate security, owners were caught, as it were, in a trap
due to conditions over which no one had control and for which no relief was at hand.
Value was in the property but the value could not be obtained nor anything like it."
Klinke v. Samuels, 264 N. Y. 144, 149, 190 N. E. 324, 326 (1934).
82. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co. v. Ekenberg, 101 Misc. 62, 292 N. Y. Supp. 142
(Sup. Ct. 1936); Fulton Trust Co. v. Kraft, 155 Misc. 709, 2,0 N. Y. Supp. 397 (Sup.
Ct. 1935), 35 Coi- L. REv. 1314; Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Kraft,
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on affidavits alone and without a hearing -a method invariably sealing
the fate of the mortgagee."3
After three years of application of Section 1083-a by the lower courts
the Court of Appeals finally recognized in Heiman v. Bishop8 4 that old
standards of market value had become useless and that willing buyers,
willing sellers and ordinary conditions had gone by the way. The
lower court, finding that there existed no "fair and reasonable market
value of the premises" as of the date of the sale, denied application for
a deficiency judgment because during the nearest earlier period in which
it found a market, the value of the property exceeded the debt.
The Court of Appeals, however, found that the purpose of Section 1083-a
was not to deprive mortgagees of deficiency judgments but rather to
establish a new "equitable standard" for determining them. Evidence of
value, according to the court, might be found not only in market trans-
actions of real property similarly situated but also by an examination
of every relevant element of value apart from the market, including "age
and construction of the buildings on the premises, the rent received
therefor, assessed value [for tax purposesi, location, condition of repair
. . . conditions in the neighborhood which affect the value of the
property therein, accessibility," etc.8" Thus the court precluded resort
to a pre-depression period of high market prices for purposes of deter-
mining value unless a non-market appraisal on the basis of the existing
condition of the premises were found impossible.8 ' As a rough general-
ization, it can be said that values so found by the lower courts after the
decision in the Heiman case tended to approximate tax assessments.
Although deficiency judgments were granted far less frequently than
248 App. Div. 216, 288 N. Y. Supp. 1004 (1st Dep't 1936), rev'd, 273 N. Y. 634, 7 N. E.
(2d) 730 (1937). This period was selected because real estate, unlike the stock market,
was unaffected by the depression until late in 1931 or early in 1932. See the Ekenbcrgq
case, supra at 64, 292 N. Y. Supp. at 144.
83. This method received a check in the Guttag case, holding that when the motion
papers present an issue of fact, either party is entitled to trial before the court or ref-
eree. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. H. & J. Guttag Co., 265 N. Y. 292, 192 N. E. 481 (1934).
The court or referee may not go outside the record and base its conclusion upon an inde-
pendent view of the premises or other information personally obtained and not subject
to cross-examination. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Eisner, 276 N. Y. 121, 11
N. E. (2d) 561 (1937). The report of the referee is not conclusive on the court and the
Appellate Division may make its own determination of value on appeal. McCarthy v.
Jablonski, 253 App. Div. 759 (2d Dep't 1937); Ballin v. Apperson Realty Co., 258 App.
Div. 264, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 251 (1st Dep't 1939), aff'd, 283 N. Y. 754, 28 N. E. (2d) 973
(1940).
84. 272 N. Y. 83, 4 N. E. (2d) 944 (1936).
85. Id. at 88, 4 N. E. (2d) at 945-46; cf. In re Bd. of Water Supply, 277 N. Y. 452,
14 N. E. (2d) 789 (1938).
86. Corn Exchange Bank Trust Co. v. Island Park-Long Beach, Inc., 251 App. Div.
857, 298 N. Y. Supp. 496 (2d Dep't 1937), aff'd, 277 N. Y. 565, 13 N. E. (2d) 475 (1938);
First Nat. Bank v. Goodman, 173 Misc. 562, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 562 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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before the emergency period, Heiman v. Bishop did not, as predicted by
one cynic, have the effect of inducing the lower courts, after examining
expensive records, invariably to deny applications for deficiencies.
Action on the Bond. Under the emergency legislation, an action still
lies on the debt whenever one lies to foreclose a mortgage,37 provided
the personal liability of the debtor has not been released. Section 1083-b
permits the defendant in such an action to "set off the fair and reason-
able market value of the mortgaged premises less amounts owing on
prior liens and encumbrances." The burden of proving the value of
the premises lies with the defendant.SS This "set-off" does not operate,
however, as part payment of the debt or as an ultimate credit in the
mortgagor's favor, but merely as a statutory suspension of a part of his
obligation. Although the mortgagee recovers a judgment only for the
difference between the debt and the fair value of the property, he may
recover the balance in an in personam action after the expiration of the
emergency.89 Or after the emergency period he may sue to foreclose
and obtain a deficiency judgment, subject, however, to a credit for the
amount previously recovered at law.90
If a mortgagee were also a debtor of the mortgagor on a separate
obligation, he was not precluded by the moratorium statutes as #originally
enacted from setting off the mortgage debt in an action by the m rt-
gagor on the separate obligation. The statute, it was held, suspended
only the right to maintain an action. Thus a banker-mortgagee could
deduct the amount of a depositor-mortgagor's account and properly
tender a satisfaction piece of the mortgage." This right of set-off in the
mortgagee, predicated on maturity of the debt, was promptly terminated, 2
however, by the enactment of a statute expressly extending the time of
payment of principal until the end of the emergency or thereafter.0
3
87. Emsig v. Fuchs, 159 Misc. 803, 288 N. Y. Supp. 784 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
88. Ibid. An answer alleging the value of the premises equals the debt preients a
triable issue not subject to summary disposition. Gainari v. Horc, 249 Aip,. Div. 537,
293 N. Y. Supp. 479 (1st Dep't 1937) ; Bergman v. Santamaria, 244 App. Div. 819, 271
N. Y. Supp. 876 (2d Dep't 1935).
89. Goldman v. Ginsberg, 247 App. Div. 797, 286 N. Y. Supp. 137 (2d Dep't 1936).
90. N. Y. C. P. A. § 1083-b; Tanico v. Mule, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 2.3, 1935, p. 2 47, cotl.
5 (Sup. C.).
91. Kress v. Central Trust Co., 246 App. Div. 76, 2q3 N. Y. Supp. 467 (4th Dep't
1935), aff'd, 272 N. Y. 629, 5 N. E. (2d) 365 (1936), (1935) 4S H-av. L R-X. 345;
Matter of Westchester Trust Co., N. Y. L. J., Mar. 24, 1934, p. 1427, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.);
see Mfatter of Vicinus, 159 Misc. 903, 290 N. Y. Supp. 20 (Surr. Ct. 1936) (right tw
retain collateral security); N. Y. Title & Mtge. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 241 App. Div.
246, 271 N. Y. Supp. 775 (1st Dep't 1934), affd, 268 N. Y. 547, 198 N. E. 397 (1935).
92. In re Prudence Co., 16 F. Supp. 282, 285 (E. D. N. Y. 1936) ; Matter of Knight,
162 Misc. 942, 296 N. Y. Supp. 506 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
93. N. Y. C. P. A. § 1077-a, as amended, N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 359. This statute
L.xtvnds some mortgages to the end of the Limrguicy, sum for :i% invndib longer and
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If a foreclosing mortgagee fails to apply for a deficiency judgment
within 90 days after the foreclosure sale or if an application is denied,
the proceeds of sale are conclusively deemed to satisfy the mortgage
debt,94 and the mortgagee is barred from action on the bond.," If,
however, the lien of the mortgage has meanwhile been extinguished by
paramount foreclosure or tax sale, the obligation is no longer secured
by a mortgage or subject to mortgage legislation. If in such a case the
obligor could offset value, the amount of offset would represent not
a suspension but an annihilation of the mortgagee's rights. Conse-
quently, if the mortgage is extinguished, the mortgagee may enforce his
bond, without an offset for the value of the property, like any other
unsecured general creditor. 6 But except where the mortgage has been
extinguished, recovery is limited to the difference between the amount
of the obligation and the fair value of the property as determined by
the court. The improbability that this amount will be substantial has
discouraged mortgagees from undertaking the trouble and expense of
litigating actions on the bondY An action for interest, however, opens
up possibilities.
Actions for Interest. In Johnson v. Meyer," the Court of Appeals
permitted a mortgagee to recover judgment for interest and taxes'O alone
without offset for the value of the premises. The decision of the court,
however, raised more questions than it answered. Mindful of the fact
that judgments for interest represent but a small fraction of the mort-
gage debt, mortgagees wondered if recovery would, under Civil Practice
Act Section 1077, prejudice a subsequent foreclosure. By its terms the
statute did not contemplate an action for part of the debt, and authority
others for one year longer-an apparent effort to taper off the moratorium and one which
is becoming academic through recurrent extensions of the emergency legislation. Cf.
N. Y. C. P. A. § 1077-g, as amended, N. Y. Laws 1941, c. 782.
94. N. Y. C. P. A. § 1083-a. The period begins from the delivery of the referee's
deed, not the auction sale. Ibid.
95. Honeyman v. Hanan, 275 N. Y. 382, 9 N. E. (2d) 970 (1937); di. Rosenfeld v.
Levine, 249 App. Div. 142, 148, 291 N. Y. Supp. 474, 481 (1st Dep't 1936).
96. Wittwer v. Goldstein, 268 N. Y. 703, 198 N. E. 566 (1935); Weisel v. Hagdahl
Realty Co., 241 App. Div. 314, 271 N. Y. Supp. 629 (2d Dep't 1934), 48 HARv. L. REv.
126; see p. 387 supra, p. 409 infra.
97. One of the few cases is McKeon v. Britt, N. Y. L. J., June 29, 1939, p. 3003,
col. 5 (Sup. Ct.), where the holder of an $18,000 mortgage, junior to a first of about
$16,000, recovered judgment for $3,707.
98. 268 N. Y. 701, 198 N. E. 565 (1935).
99. Properly speaking, a mortgagee does not sue for taxes. If lie pays the tax he
may add such advance to the mortgage debt and recover judgment for its reimbursement.
This is provided by N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 254(6), which merely codifies a rule of
equity. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Newell, 78 Hun 293, 28 N. Y. Supp. 913 (2d Dep't
1894), aff'd, 144 N. Y. 627, 39 N. E. 494 (1894) ; Baranowski v. Wetzel, 174 App. Div.
507; 161 N. Y. Supp. 153 (2d Dep't 1916) ; see 3 CoOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 1263.
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for its inapplicability to suits for less than the entire obligation was
too tenuous for the careful practitioner.00 Furthermore, if the interest
in question had accrued subsequently to maturity of the mortgage, the
issue arose whether it had become such a part of an indivisible Cause
of action for the whole obligation that recovery of part would, by
splitting a single cause, prevent further legal action by the mortgagee
upon either the bond or mortgage.
In Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Company v. Hatch,1°1 the Court
of Appeals reviewed an action for principal and installments of interest
and taxes. The defendant had sought to offset value against all the
claims. Without discussion the court affirmed an order striking the
defense from all causes except principal, thus holding severable the cause
for interest and taxes. The narrow limits of this decision prompted
some mortgagees to proceed cautiously by way of declaratory judgment.
In a series of subsequent decisions, however, mortgagees were held
entitled to recover judgments for taxes and interest, regardless of ma-
turity of principal, without prejudice to the right to maintain actions
for installments thereof subsequently accruing, for the principal of the
mortgage debt, or for foreclosure. 1 2 Declaratory judgments were fre-
quently granted to this effect.'0 3
The courts usually advanced two rationales for this result, namely
that the parties intended severable causes by fixing separate times of
payment for interest and principal, and that the legislative suspension of
principal did not in terms postpone interest and taxes. The first reason,
however, seems unreliable since the mortgage covenants in issue were
100. Scheidell v. Llewellyn Realty Co., 177 N. Y. Supp. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1918). N. Y. C.
P. A. § 1077 provides: "Where final judgment for the plaintiff has been rendered in an
action to recover any part of the mortgage debt, an action shall not be maintained to
foreclose the mortgage, unless an execution against the property of the defendant has bken
issued . . . and has been returned wholly or partly unsatisfied."
101. 273 N. Y. 507, 6 N. E. (2d) 426 (1937).
102. Hecht v. Flatto, 158 Misc. 464, 285 N. Y. Suplo. 949 (I~st Dep't 193U 1, aff'd, 249
App. Di-. 722, 292 N. Y. Supp. 995 (1st Dep't 1936) (action against guarantor); BlaI:
v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 166 Misc. 318, 2 X. Y. S. (2d) 3S0 (N. Y. City
Ct. 1937) (ibid.); Hebrew Children's Home, Inc . \Walter, 1e Misc. 117, 5 N. Y.
S. (2d) 228 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (mortgagor's conveyance no defense,); see cases cited infra
note 103.
103. Union Trust Co. v. Kaplan, 247 App. Div. 588, 28 N. Y. Supp. 2.38 (4th Dept
1936), second appeal, 249 App. Div. 20, 292 N. Y. Supp. 152 (4th Dep't 1936); Vest-
chester Trust Co. v. Estate of Edward Underhill, Inc.. N. Y. L. J., Mar. 19,1931, p. 13 -4,
col. 3 (Sup. Ct.), aft'd, 255 App. Div. 1013, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 575 (2d Deplt 1933 ; Ban!: ,
New York v. Blumenthal, N. Y. L. J., Mar. 30, 1940, p. 1445, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.), aft'd,
260 App. Div. 919, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 151 (1st Dep't 1940), aff'd, 33 N. E. (2d) 539
(N. Y. 1941). One court, however, giving such relief against sume defendants, denied it
against others on the technical ground that the latters' failure to challenge the plaintiff's
rights avoided the creation of a' justiciable controversy. Union Trust 0% v. Simp',,n,
160 Misc. 836, 290 N. Y. Supp. 859 (Sup. CL 1936), (1t937) 22 Coru:. L. J. 407.
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drawn at a time when separate actions were not seriously contemplated.
As for the second ground, it must first be noted that the general limita-
tion on splitting any cause of action was devised for the benefit of
debtors' 0 4 to prevent multifariousness and harassment. Since interest
accruing after maturity is generally deemed a component part of the
debt, permitting these actions by the mortgagee infringes the purpose
of the rules against splitting causes by allowing the plaintiff's election
to govern defendant's right of set-off. It has been argued accordingly
that the legislature never intended such a result."' But legislative intent,
always a doubtful matter, 106 is perhaps evidenced by the legislature's
failure to override the governor's veto of a series of bills ending separate
suits for interest and taxes1 °7 Undoubtedly, a statute forbidding actions
for interest would have manifested a clear legislative intent, but such
a statute would probably have been invalid insofar as it purported to
be retroactive'08 -a result which would have defeated the purpose of
the emergency legislation. This legislation was enacted not to void the
mortgagor's obligation but to suspend foreclosure actions for principal
if interest and taxes were paid.'09 It has been suggested that a mortgagee
who sues for interest comes within the spirit of the moratorium by
avoiding foreclosure'" but a more impressive argument is that, regard-
less of express "intent", the emergency acts avoid a transgression of
legislative power by sanctioning actions for interest and taxes inde-
pendently of principal. It might be possible, however, to end the main-
tenance of separate actions by procedural legislation unifying the separate
causes "l without impairing the mortgagee's substantive rights.
The right to recover interest and taxes independently has been limited
to in personam actions against the mortgagor. The lower court in While
v. Wielandt"2 held that a mortgagee, joining causes for interest and
104. Carrington v. Crocker, 37 N. Y. 336 (1867); Mills v. Garrison, 3 Keyes 40
(N. Y. 1866).
105. See (1937) 22 CORN. L. Q. 407. Linowitz, Suits for Interest Under the N. Y.
Moratorium (1940) 25 CORN L. Q. 4P0, 402, concurs in the statement that the majority
rule merges principal and interest after maturity. But cf. cases in Union Trust Co. v.
Simpson, 160 Misc. 836, 839, 290 N. Y. Supp. 859, 862 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
106. See Woollcott v. Schubert, 217 N. Y. 212, 221, 111 N. E. 829, 831 (1916),
("statements and opinions of legislators uttered in the debates" incompetent as evi-
dence); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 427, 88 A. L. R. 1481,
1489, 1519 (1933).
107. See Linowitz, supra note 105, at 409. N. Y. Assembly Intro. No. 1912 (1941).
108. See cases cited infra notes 132, 133, 149.
109. White v. Wielandt, 259 App. Div. 676, 678-79, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 560, 563-64
(2d Dep't 1940), aff'd, 30 N. E. (2d) 725 (N. Y. 1941).
110. Union Trust Co. v. Kaplan, 249 App. Div. 280, 284, 292 N. Y. Supp. 152, 159
(4th Dep't 1936).
111. Compare Honeyman v. Hanan, 275 N. Y. 382, 9 N. E. (2d) 970 (1937), appeal
dismissed, 302 U. S. 375 (1937).
112. 172 Misc. 686, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 666 (County Ct. 1939).
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taxes with foreclosure, could obtain the usual foreclosure relief for
principal and, in addition, an independent money judgment for the full
amount of interest and taxes without proof of value under Section
1083-a. The court justified this result on the ground that the Hatch
case had held the causes severable. The judgment was reversed, how-
ever, by the Appellate Division, Second Department, on the theory that
this was a palpable evasion of Section 1083-a."la The basis of the
reversal was twofold. First, the court held that interest and taxes were
such an integral part of the mortgage debt that an action to recover
them was not severable from an action of foreclosure for the principal.
But this point might not have force if default in payments of interest is
not the sole basis for foreclosure. If the cause for interest is not essen-
tial to foreclosure, a holding that the actions are inseverable seems to
contravene the Hatch case. Secondly, the court was on sounder grounds
in holding that the consolidation statutes previously discussed barred the
simultaneous maintenance of foreclosure and an action for the debt.'14
Directly contrary to the TWhite case, however, was the earlier case of
Rassbach v. Aurora Holdizg Company, decided by the Appellate Divi-
sion, First Department, on the basis of the Hatch case. Here, too, the
same defaults were used as a basis for foreclosure and a money judg-
ment. The decision seems unsound in disregarding the consolidatio-on
statutes.1 6
Collateral Security. The emergency mortgage laws make no express
provision for the disposition of collateral given to the mortgagee as
security for payment of the debt. Such security may consist of rents
to be collected by foreclosure receivers, collateral bonds, claims for tax
refunds, claims for proceeds of fire insurance, chattel or supplemental
real property mortgages, or securities delivered to the mortgagee.
Civil Practice Act Section 1083-a provided that in the absence of an
application for a deficiency judgment, or in the event of its denial, the
proceeds of the foreclosure sale should be conclusively deemed to satisfy
the mortgage debt and no action lay for the deficit. As stsi -n as this
statute became effective, however, a question arose as to whether a mort-
gagee was entitled to the receiver's rents without having rect-overed a
113. 259 App. Div. 676, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 560 (2d Dep't 1940). affd, 31) X. E. 2d)
725 (N. Y. 1941).
114. See pp. 387-90 supra.
115. 252 App. Div. 842, 300 N. Y. Supp. 601 (1st Dep't 1937).
116. The case, however, had a peculiar sequence. Because ,,f the plaintiff's failure
to apply for a deficiency judgment under Section 1083-a the pr icceds tof the fcireclture
sale were later held a complete satisfaction of the m,,rtgage debt and a liquidati,n hy
operation of law of the separate money judgment he had previ,,usly obtained. R,_s4,.:ch
v. Rosenblum, 260 App. Div. 206, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 725 Olst Dep't 1941)), iff'd, 2t4
N. Y. 745, 31 N. E. (2d) 509 (1940).
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deficiency judgment. The lower courts were in hopeless conflict11 but
a prompt amendment to Section 1083-a disposed of the question by pro-
viding that the proceeds of a foreclosure receivership or assignment of
rents go to the mortgagee, to the extent of the deficit resulting from
the foreclosure sale, regardless of a deficiency judgment.'
Where a part of the mortgaged premises was taken in condemnation
prior to foreclosure, the Court of Appeals has held that the mortgagee
may satisfy his lien from the award without applying for a deficiency
judgment under Section 1083-a." 0 The court, however, did not answer
a certified question then presented as to whether the presumption of
payment, created by Section 1083-a, was limited to a foreclosing mort-
gagee seeking a personal deficiency judgment against an obligor.' It
is unsettled, therefore, whether this presumption bars the sale of securi-
ties delivered to the mortgagee as additional collateral.' 2'
117. Receiver's balance to mortgagee: Prudential Ins. Co. v. Adelphi Hall, Ite.,
242 App. Div. 704, 272 N. Y. Supp. 917 (2d Dep't 1934) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, v.
Rosenfield, 153 Misc. 218, 274 N. Y. Supp. 531 (Sup. Ct. 1934). Contra: Bowery Say.
Bank v. Letienne, N. Y. L. J., May 3, 1934, p. 2142, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.) ; Bowery Say.
Bank v. Tenart Realty Co., N. Y. L. J., June 12, 1934, p. 2856, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.). Many
additional cases pro and con appear in the New York Law Journal during 1934. Despite
failure to recover a deficiency judgment, proceeds of fire insurance policies were awarded
to the mortgagee [Petroff v. First Nat. Bank, 258 App. Div. 1007, 16 N. Y, S. (2d)
771 (3d Dep't 1940)] as well as refunds of taxes paid by mortgagee or receiver [Greeni-
wich Say. Bank v. Paramount Holding Co., N. Y. L. J., Aug. 20, 1937, p. 445, col. 2
(Sup. Ct.); Irving Say. Bank v. 128 East 60 St. Co., N. Y. L. J., June 2, 1938, p. 2660,
col. 6 (Sup. Ct.) ; Bowery Say. Bank v. Burchill Realty Co., N. Y. L. J., Oct. 11, 1938,
p. 1075, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.)].
118. N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 562. But see People v. Sexton, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 25, 1941.
p. 396, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.) (refund to owner where mortgagee paid taxes with funds as-
signed by owner) ; People ex rel: 342 East 57th St. Co. v. Miller, 262 App. Div. 132, 28
N. Y. S. (2d) 258 (1st Dep't 1941) ; People cx rel. N. Y. Title & Mtge. Co. v. Miller,
262 App. Div. 175, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 430 (1st Dep't 1941) (tax refunds). Before these
cases the refund was occasionally given to the owner, as the "taxpayer," despite his
assignment of the rents to the mortgagee. People v. Sexton, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 25, 1941,
p. 396, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.).
119. Matter of City of New York, 273 N. Y. 62, 6 N. E. (2d) 98 (1937) ; Id. (Hough-
ton Ave.), 266 N. Y. 26, 193 N. E. 539 (1934) ; Id. (Neptune Ave.), 271 N. Y. 331, 3
N. E. (2d) 445 (1936).
120. The Cyllene Co. v. Eisen, 272 N. Y. 526, 4 N. E. (2d) 431 (1936).
121. The Appellate Division, Second Department, has permitted two mortgagees to
resort to such security without application for a deficiency judgment. Westerbeke v.
Bank of Huntington & Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 632, 287 N. Y. Supp. 228 (2d Dep't
1936), aff'd, 272 N. Y. 593, 4 N. E. (2d) 819 (1936). Accord, Amazon v. East N. Y.
Say. Bank, 168 Misc. 738, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 141 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd, 256 App. Div.
1072, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 567 (2d Dep't 1939) (cash security) ; Pink v. S. M. H. Co.,
N. Y. L. J., May 3, 1937, p. 2217, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.) (collateral mortgage) ; cf. Lenner v.
Corso, 162 Misc. 500, 295 N. Y. Supp. 827 (Cty. Ct. 1937), aff'd, 258 App. Div. 839, 15
N. Y. S. (2d) 668 (3d Dep't 1939) ; Blust v. Yonkers Nat. Bank, 260 App. Div. 947, 23
N. Y. S. (2d) 512 (2d Dep't 1940). But it has forbidden another mortgagee. Matter
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It is clear, however, that the presumption of payment applies gener-
ally to collateral bonds made payable to the mortgagee and given by
third persons as further collateral. Civil Practice Act Section 1083-b
permits offset of the value of the property in an action on a mortgage
debt "which originated simultaneously with such mortgage and which
is secured solely by such mortgage" in favor of any person "directly
or indirectly or contingently liable therefor." "Secured solely by such
mortgage" literally refers to the mortgage bond and excludes an addi-
tional collateral bond. But in Klinke v,. Saiue1s -12 2 the Court of Appeals
determined that "whatever inaccuracies in language there may be," the
phrase "directly or indirectly or contingently liable therefor" indicated
a legislative intent to apply the statute to a collateral bond. The col-
lateral bond involved was delivered simultaneously with the bond and
mortgage and for a sum equal to the mortgage debt. In a later case, City
Bank Farmers Trust Company v. Ardlea Incorporation," the collateral
bond was delivered six years after the execution of the bond and mort-
gage and for only part of the mortgage debt. This bond was neither
"secured solely" nor had it "originated simultaneously" with the bond
and mortgage and, thus again, would have been excluded by a literal
construction of the statute. By reading together Section 1083-b and com-
panion moratorium statutes, the court found a general legislative intent
to include this bond, and repudiated the literal meaning of the quoted
parts of the statute it was construing. In City Bank Farmers Trust
Company v. i'fcConnel,' "4 however, a collateral bond for part of the
debt was delivered to a mortgagee in circumstances generally similar
to the Ardlea case, with the distinction that the bond was delivered after
the effective date of the moratorium statutes and included a waiver
thereof. Without opinion the bond was held enforceable.' n  It is note-
worthy that the emergency statutes forbidding actions for principal dur-
ing the emergency expressly forbid a waiver as against public policy,
-12 1
while no such provision appears in the statutes limiting money judg-
ments. Yet in the Ardlea case the court found it unnecessary to confine
of Williams, 258 App. Div. 592, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 335 (2d Dep't 1940) (assignment of
legacy), (1940) 53 HAlv. L. REv. 1400; Lang v. N. Y. Joint Land Bank, 155 Misc. 779,
280 N. Y. Supp. 766 (Sup. Ct 1935) (collateral chattel mortgage) ; Fay v. Rubenstein,
N. Y. L. J., Mar. 27, 1934, p. 1467, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.) (collateral mortgage); Uedcro
Realty Co. v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 175 Misc. 1082 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
122. 264 N. Y. 144, 190 N. E. 324 (1934).
123. 267 N. Y. 224, 196 N. E. 34 (1935).
124. 284 N. Y. 686, 30 N. E. (2d) 725 (1940).
125. An affirmance without opinion is unsatisfactory as a basis for conclusions. While
affirming the result it does not necessarily endorse the reasoning of the lower court.
Palmer v. Travis, 223 N. Y. 150, 119 N. E. 437 (1918); Marcus, Affirmance Without
Opinion (1937) 6 FORDHAm L. REV. 212.
126. N. Y. C. P. A. § 1077-d.
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itself to the particular section of the emergency laws in issue and deduced
a legislative intent from the entire statutory scheme.
There seems to be no reason for distinguishing between the right to
enforce a collateral bond and the right to sell stocks and bonds given
for the same purpose. Both are generally delivered when the obligor
is in extremis. The only conclusion to be drawn is that problems of
construction have not been entirely solved.
Validity. During the early thirties the various states enacted every
form of emergency mortgage statute - laws delaying proceedings for
foreclosure or extending periods of redemption; abolishing or reducing
deficiency judgments by fixing minimum prices for sale or allowing
fair and reasonable value as a credit irrespective of the amount realized;
and refusing confirmation of sales, or confirming only on condition that
fair credit be given on the debt. In general, emergency statutes are
upheld if they are designed merely to postpone the ultimate remedy of the
mortgagee, and provide the mortgagee with reasonable payments or other
safeguards during the interim. 127 In 1934 the Supreme Court of the
United States in the Blaisdell case 2 ' upheld a Minnesota emergency
statute empowering the courts to extend temporarily the period of re-
demption, upon the owner's application, provided a reasonable share of
the income or rents were applied in the interim toward interest, carrying
charges, or the principal of the indebtedness as ordered by the court. Pro-
tection against waste was accorded the mortgagee. The right to apply for
a deficiency judgment was deferred until the expiration of the extended
redemption period. The Court deemed the statute a reasonable modi-
fication of the mortgagee's remedy without serious impairment of his
substantive right on the ground that neither the debt, purchaser's title,
nor right to a deficiency judgment was affected and that merely a
reasonable extension of time was given. The emergency, according to
the Court, justified temporary exercise of powers normally quiescent.
Comparison was drawn to the power to give temporary relief from
physical disaster and reliance was placed on the emergency rent cases."t
127. Beaver Cty. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Winowich, 323 Pa. St. 483, 486-88, 515, 187
Atl. 481, 482-83, 921 (1936), 3 U. PiTT. L. REV. 54; Bunn, Impairment of Contracts:
Mortgage and Inurance Moratoria (1933) 1 U. oF Cni. L. REv. 249, 250; (1933) 47
HAgv. L. REv. 299, 301; and, generally, see Feller, Maoratory Legislationl: ,A C0,para-
live Study (1933) 46 HARV. L. REv. 1061, 1069.
128. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 88 A. L. R. 1481, 1519
(1934).
129. Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U. S. 242 (1922) (and cases there
cited). These uphold statutes designed to cope with an acute housing shortage after
the last war by permitting tenants to hold over after expiration of their leases on pay-
ment of a reasonable rental.
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But the decision, five to four, expressly depended ton the safeguards
included in the statute. 30
Civil Practice Act 1083-a and other comparable statutes do not po-st-
pone foreclosure; they qualify and limit deficiency judgments. Too
sustain their validity two methods of approach are ptossible: 1 l
attempted reconciliation with the contracts clause of the Federal C. in-
stitution, or (2) circumvention of constitutional questions on the
ground that the statutes merely codify inherent powers of chancery.
The New York courts are logically committed to the first because in
the Dunkley case' 3 ' Kent had held equity unable to render a deficiency
judgment- It follows that deficiency judgments are creatures of statute
and the immediate question is whether a right so created is subject to
retroactive modification or recall. This approach, however, runs promptly
into Bronson v. Kinzie"'3 and other decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States invalidating, under the contracts clause, statutes
comparable to Section 1083-a.Z' The specific statutes held void sought
to limit deficiency judgments by forbidding sales for less than a pre-
scribed fraction of the appraised value. The Bronson case recognized
that a "remedy" may be made less convenient or more tardy or difficult
without impairment of the "obligation" within the cointracts clause,
24
but flatly held that a statute overstepped the bounds if it substituted
appraised value for sale price as the basis of deficiency judgments.
The first New York cases testing the validity of the current mortgage
moratorium laws involved the statutes staying actions for principal.I'
These were readily upheld, on grounds similar to those in the Blaisdell
case, as a reasonable exercise of police power during a declared emer-
gency.' 36 In its first test case, Klinke v. Samuels,3a the Court of Appeals
130. The limits of the doctrine became apparent in Vorthen Co. v. Kavanaugli, 2,'5
U. S. 56 (1935) (unanimously holding statute invalid which e.tended actionable default
from 65 days to 2! years, reduced penalty interest from 201 -to 3G, and deprivwd mt, rt-
gagee of possession during redemption period extended to 4 years).
131. Dunkley v. Van Buren, 3 Johns. Ch. 330 (N. Y. 181).
132. 1 How. 311 (U. S. 1843).
133. McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608 (U. S. 18441 ; Gantky's Lv-u v. EVing,
3 How. 707 (U. S. 1845). The statutes involved in the Bronso, case and these cases v~kre
not labeled emergency statutes.
134. Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. 122. 200 (U. S. 18li1); Richmond Mtge. .
Loan Co. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 30U U. S. 124, 123, 10", A. L. R. $%, $'1
(1937).
135. 'MeCarty v. Prudence-Bonds Co., 149 Misc. 13. 26 N. Y. Supp. 629 (Sup. Ct.
1933) ; Sherwin v. Jonas, 149 Aisc. 481, 207 X. Y. Supp. 751) (City Ct. 1933), rc-',d on
other grounds, 150 Misc. 343, 269 N. Y. Supp. 121 (Sup. Ct. 1934) ; LQiorto v. Drui-
Co., 263 N. Y. 699, 198 N. E. 565 (1935) ; 269 N. Y. o.77, 20o X. F. 54, appcaI dismissed.
299 U. S. 617 (1936).
136. Reliance was placed on the emergency rent cases, the brevity uf the Fmergency
period, and the requirement that interest and taxes be I-aid during the nimratriun.
137. 264 N. Y. 144, 190 N. E. 324 (1934).
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considered the validity of Civil Practice Act Section 1083-a, not a post-
ponement statute but one modifying mortgagees' substantive rights to
deficiency judgments. With no discussion other than a recital of emer-
gency conditions, the court concluded that "such legislation, reasonably
seeking only temporary relief, is not unconstitutional." A few months
later in the Guttag 38 case, the court referred to the statutdry basis of
deficiency judgments and remarked that it had used the language quoted
"perhaps unnecessarily". It ruled, however, that the issue before it in-
volved merely the construction, not the validity, of Section 1083-a. Sub-
sequently in Honeyman v. Hanan 1 0 the court upheld the statute, but
perhaps unnecessarily. There a mortgagee brought an action at law for
the deficit after foreclosure. In the foreclosure action an application
for a deficiency judgment had been denied and the mortgagee discon-
tinued against the obligor in order to bring the law action. The Court
of Appeals held the complaint legally insufficient. On appeal the Supreme
Court of the United States remanded for specification of the precise
constitutional question raised. 4 The Court of Appeals then framed a
narrow question, i.e., whether legislation is valid which requires deter-
mination of deficiency judgments in foreclosure actions.14' And appeal
on this point was dismissed on grounds of a lack of a federal question in
the mere procedure of state courts. 42  In Honeyman v. Clarke,4 the
Court of Appeals again affirmed the validity of Section 1083-a on the
basis of its earlier decisions.
Outside New York, statutes comparable to Sections 1083-a have gener-
ally been invalidated by state courts. In Beaver County Building & Loan
Association v. Winowich,14' a well articulated Pennsylvania decision,
three reasons for the invalidity of this type of statute were advanced.
The argument based on the brevity of the emergency period was dis-
missed on the ground that, regardless of the duration of the legislation,
the mortgagee's loss was permanent. It was also observed that change
from an obligation for cash to an obligation for some cash plus
"fair value" of the property as determined in the absence of sales gave
the mortgagee no assurance that he could ever realize that value. The
138. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. H. & J. Guttag Co., 265 N. Y. 292, 192 N. E. 481 (1934).
139. 271 N. Y. 564, 3 N. E. (2d) 186 (1936).
140. 300 U. S. 14 (1937).
141. 275 N. Y. 382, 9 N. E. (2d) 970 (1937).
142. 302 U. S. 375 (1937) ; cf. Lapp v. Belvedere, 116 N. J. L. 563, 184 Atl. 837, 115
A. L. R. 429, 435 (1936) (statute valid requiring joinder of obligor in foreclosure as
condition precedent to subsequent action for deficit).
143. 278 N. Y. 467, 17 N. E. (2d) 131 (1938), af'd sub norn. Honeynan v. Jacobs,
306 U. S. 539 (1939).
144. 323 Pa. St. 483, 515, 187 At. 481, 921 (1936) (collecting cases in accord), (1930)
3 U. OF Pi r. L. REv. 54; see cases cited in Note (1938) 115 A. L. R. 435, 436.
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realism of this approach becomes apparent where the income is insufficient
and the mortgagee must "feed" the property for part or all taxes and
carrying charges until the hypothetical "fair value" of the experts can
be obtained, if ever. Finally, the court noted that a sale to an outsider
at foreclosure for less than the "fair value" gives the mortgagee nothing
in return for the enforced credit. The reasoning of this court appears
conclusive against validity if deficiency judgnments are based upon statute.
In Honeyman v. Jacobs,141 the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered for the first time in justiciable form the constitutionality of
Section 1083-a and held it valid. The shadow of Bronson v. Kinzie was
avoided by the chancery approach. The Court cited the Blaisddll case,
which is readily distinguishable, as well as the I'achovia case, which
sustained a North Carolina statute, retrospective in application but
limited in scope. 4 The temper of the Court in the WFachovitr case
was indicated by its observation that the mortgage loan transaction con-
templated such credit for the value of the property as would make the
mortgagee whole, not enriched. This idea was repeated in Hot ,wz an
v. Jacobs, where the Court was impressed by the fact that the mortgagce
had acquired property appraised at $25,000 through a mortgage loan
of $15,000. The record did not, however, require consideration of the
effect of acquisition of the property by a third person at the foreclosure
sale for less than "fair value". The Court stated:
"Section 1083-a in substance assured to the court the exercise of
its appropriate equitable powers. By the normal exercise of these
powers, a court of equity in a foreclosure suit would have full
authority to fix the terms and time of the foreclosure sale and to
refuse to confirm sales upon equitable grounds where they were
found to be unfair or the price bid was inadequate. . . . In this
control over the foreclosure sale under its decree, the court could
consider and determine the value of the property sold to the mort-
gagee and what the mortgagee would thus realize upon the mortgage
debt if the sale were confirmed."' 47
145. 306 U. S. 539 (1939), 52 Hanv. L. REv. 13 7 (193'1) 39 GL L. Ra. 1227.
146. Richmond Mtge. & Loan Corp. v. Wachovia Dank & Trut Co., ,OU U. S. 124,
108 A. L. R. 886, 891 (1937). The 1J'achoz ia statute applicd tu truste\ sak , at the
instance of the mortgagees, where title wais acquired by mrtgagxems fr le than th
debt, and provided that in a subsequent action for the residue the ubligr c.juld ,fi-tt
the value of the property. This statute did not cover !-ales tv third lprs -,l al1 thereby
avoided one of the objections pointed out in the I'inszechh case. Equally inwI.rtant, it
left untouched another complete remedy of the mortgagee-the ordinary julkial -ak-
and thereby avoided complete impairment of remedy as in Bronson v. KIin:ie. Its 1,rac-
tical effect, however, was a brake on deficiency judgments betause deficiency julq-
ments through judicial sales were already under equitable control in XNorth Carolina.
See (1939) 52 HAlv. L. RFv. 1367.
147. 306 U. S. 539, 543 (1939).
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The language of the Court indicates a sanction of equitable control over
deficiency judgments through control over the sale, at least where the
mortgagee himself purchases, regardless of emergency conditions. This
implication, however, was rejected by the Iew York Court of Appeals.
New York's restriction of its emergency mortgage laws to mortgages
made before July 1, 1932, prevented control under Section 1083-a of
deficiency judgments on subsequently executed mortgages.1 415 Upon recoin-
mendation of a legislative commission which relied on the Wachovia
case, the provisions of Section 1083-a were made part of the permanent
law. In National City Bank v. Gelfert,14'9 however, the Court of Appeals,
following Bronson v. Kinzie, held the new statute invalid insofar as it
applied to preexisting mortgages, i.e., mortgages made between July 1,
1932, and April 7, 1938. The court stressed the fact that the statute
enacted a permanent and not an emergency change in remedy. Conceding
normal state control over remedies in which a litigant has no vested
interest, the court decided, nevertheless, that the statute had withdrawn
all effective remedies. The two other available remedies - action on
the bond and action for the deficit after foreclosure - were regarded as
inadequate. An action for the deficit was deemed unduly hampered by
the consolidation statutes and an action on the bond, in lieu of fore-
closure, was held unsatisfactory because any judgment recovered could
not be used to levy on the debtor's equity of redemption.1" ° In contrast
to the emphasis of the Court of Appeals it is noteworthy that limita-
tions upon the practical efficiency of alternative remedies received slight
consideration in the Wachovia case.
The mortgagee in the Gelfert case had purchased at the foreclosure
sale but the court's attitude was conditioned by the opportunity of third-
party purchasers to bid at the sale. It remarked that the new statute
compelled the mortgagee to bid a sum equal to:
"the market value as that value may thereafter be determined by
the court or must go without any satisfaction of so much of the
debt as equals the difference between the value as so determined
and a lower price paid on a sale to a third party.''5
The court concluded that this factor left "no room for the play of any
equitable consideration" and characterized as utterly capricious efforts
148. N. Y. Trust Co. v. Gude, 246 App. Div. 784, 284 N. Y. Supp. 233 (2d Dep't
1935); Decker v. Dutcher, 247 App. Div. 689, 289 N. Y. Supp. 553 (3d Dep't 1936) ,
Chase v. Harvey, 253 App. Div. 15, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 541 (3d Dep't 1937).
149. 284 N. Y. 13, 29, N. E. (2d) 449, 130 A. L. R. 1472, 1482 (1940), rcv'd, 313 U.
S. 221 (1941).
150. N. Y. C. P. A. §§ 710, 711; Tice v. Annin, 2 Johns. Ch. 125 (N. Y. 1816). The
purpose is apparently to prevent foreclosure by means of attachment. 2 Pn citv, ,NfoaT-
GAGES (1893) § 1561.
151. 284 N. Y. 13, 21, 29 N. E. (2d) 449, 453 (1940).
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of the lower courts to exert an independent equitable control over deft-
ciency judgments.'-
2
The Gelfert case was reversed by theSupreme Court"" on the grsumnd
that a mortgagee has no constitutional right to retain the strategic
advantages of a forced sale and that a formula for fixing defickncy
judgments, restricting the mortgagee to payment in full, may be retrj-
actively adopted. The Bronson and similar cases were by-passed as in-
capable of forcing "legislatures to be blind to the lessons which anther
century had taught." Though adverting to equity's long efforts to ire-
vent judicial sales from becoming an instrument of oppressiten, the
Court premised its decision upon a legislative power, free of conSti-
tutional bars, to modernize the yardstick of value. The Jacobs case had
merely indicated that Section 1083-a had codified a power inherent in
equity. The Gelfert decision, however, expressly left open the yet unfle-
termined issue of the applicability of the new statute in cases where the
premises are purchased by a third person. It would be extrardinary
if this question were not soon presented, with an accompanying argu-
ment on behalf of a mortgagee that the proceeds of a foreclosure sale
can not be forced upon a creditor by retroactive fiat as full payment
of the mortgage debt.
Inherent in this question is the entire basis of deficiency judgnient-
and the technique and scope of equitable control. Although the Court
of Appeals has repeatedly spoken of deficiency judgments as creatures
of statute, it had held in the Frank case,1 ' long before the emergency,
that the right to a money judgment in foreclosure was not fully defined Icy
statute. The empowering statute under consideration contemplated the
determination of a deficiency judgment on the basis of the price ob-
tained at the foreclosure sale. But a junior mortgagee subequent to
initiation of a foreclosure action was precluded from realizing on a sale
152. 284 N. Y. 13, 18-20, 29 N. E. (2d) 449, 451-52 (1MO0). The Alejllate Dii i,.i,
Second Department, had previously waged an unequal struggle with the t ,,urt ,i Aeapil-,
in an effort to establish equitable control over deficiency judgments. Fte M i .a-han v.
May, 242 App. Div. 64, 273 N. Y. Supp. 475 (2d Dep't 1934); Emigrant Inlu ,t. Sav.
Bank v. Van Bokkelen, 269 N. Y. 110, 116, 199 N. E. 23, 25 (1935) ; Guarantwe Title '.
Mtge. Co. v. Scheffres, 247 App. Div. 294, 295, 285 N. Y. Supp. 4t0, 405 (24 DLgpt
1936), seconid appeal, 249 App. Div. 652, 292 N. Y. Supp. 941 (24 DLp't 193 o, rc~d.
275 N. Y. 30, 9 N. E. (2d) 764 (1937). The Monaghan and Scheffrcs a v cre la1r
cited with approval in Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 539, 543 (1939), 52 H.-nv. L. Rr%.
1367.
153. 313 U. S. 221 (1941).
154. Frank v. Davis, 135 N. Y. 275, 31 N. E. Il1U0, 17 L. R. A. 3Sti tl(92i. .c lcrd,
Sautter v. Frick, 229 App. Div. 345, 242 N. Y. Supp. 39 ,4th Depet 193111, aft'd, 2F6e
N. Y. 535, 177 N. E. 129 (1931) ; Weisl v. Hagdahl Realty Co., 241 Alp. Div. 314, 271
N\. Y. Supp. 629 (2d Dep't 1934), 48 HLnv. L. REv. 12(o; Neild v. Wu.,Jruff, 152 Mi ,.
390, 273 N. Y. Supp. 528 (Sup. Ct. 1934): Crouse v. Rowley, 3 X. Y. Supp. e,3 lSit,.
Ct. 188) (guarantor); 3 JoNES, MoR'GA'i.Es (th ed. 11121) §22o..
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by a paramount foreclosure, and thus the deficiency under the junior
mortgage could not be ascertained in the mode specified by statute.
Under these circumstances it was urged that the junior mortgagee could
proceed no further in equity but must begin anew at law. Repudiating
this argument, the Court of Appeals found no reason for limiting
chancery's jurisdiction in foreclosures and ruled that equity could make
a complete determination for the purpose of awarding a deficiency
judgment.
Furthermore, the generally accepted belief that deficiency judgments
are beyond the scope of equitable jurisdiction was seriously challenged
after an exhaustive survey by Botts, J., in Young v. Vail.15 The Ameri-
can decisions were traced directly to the Dunkley case but the Dunkley
case was impeached on the ground that the English authorities relied
upon were irrelevant. The old English mortgagee, vested with legal title
after default, went into chancery to stave off equitable interference
with his right of ejectment. His purpose was to cut off the equity of
redemption and confirm his legal title. A judicial ascertainment of the
amount of debt was necessary in order to fix the terms of redemption
but the object of the suit was to fix rights in rem, not to collect a debt.
With this accomplished, complete relief was afforded. No money judg-
ment was sought or given. Botts, J., concluded, therefore, that the
authorities relied upon by Kent had no bearing because the precise ques-
tion did not arise under the early English practice. Foreclosure by sale,
on the other hand, generally presupposed title in the mortgagor, and
involved neither "foreclosure" nor "equity of redemption" in the tech-
nical sense in which these terms were transplanted from England. It was,
Botts, J., observed, a remedy for collection of a debt in which enforce-
ment of a lien was only an incident. The opinion concluded by observing
that in the Frank case the Dunkley doctrine was repudiated in the juris-
diction that gave it birth.
If equity jurisdiction over deficiency judgments be assumed, the tech-
nique of its exercise requires consideration. One suggestion, apparently
never carried out, is based upon a supposed power in chancery courts
to preclude mortgagees from bidding at foreclosure sales.'50 The right
to bid is now generally codified by statute 157 and in New York fore-
closure judgments provide that the plaintiff or any other party may bid
"unless otherwise specially ordered by the court."' 3 This phrase "obvi-
155. 29 N. M. 324, 222 Pac. 912, 34 A. L. R. 980, 1015 (1924).
156. See Very v. Russell, 65 N. H. 646, 23 Atl. 522 (1874) ; Heighe v. Evans, 164
Md. 259, 269, 164 Atl. 671, 676 (1933) ; 3 JoNEs, MORTGAGES (7th ed. 1915) §§ 1614a,
1635, 1876; 2 WILTsIE, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES (5th ed. 1939) § 675.
157. Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 580 (1935); 3 JONES, MORTGAGR'.
(8th ed. 1928) § 2101; 19 R. C. L. § 390, p. 577.
158. N. Y. Rules Civ. Pract. § 259; Brown v. Frost, 10 Paige 243, 247 (N. Y. 1843);
Mott v. VWralkly, 3 Edw. Ch. 622 (N. Y. 1842).
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ously was intended to give the court power to revive the old rule if
circumstances should prove that the mortgagee's right to bid was being
abused."' 9 The suggestion is in terrorem. It disqualifies the logical
bidder who can prevent the property from going for a song, makes
both parties helpless, and increases the amount of the deficiency judg-
ment.' 0 Whatever is left, or ever existed, of the rule is centered about
sales by a mortgagee under a power. or other circumstances in which
he controls the conduct of the sale.'' It thus prevents a mortgagee froin
selling to himself. The dubious applicability of the principle to judicial
sales is shown by the New York cases indicating that the purpose of
its rule of court is "to avoid all question"'0 2 and "to avoid the effect
of a supposed technical rule."' It is a bit of English practice which
does not obtain in this country' e and apparently never existed in New
York."' In England the rule applies to non-judicial sales ;"'O its observ-
ance in judicial sales consists of routine applications for leave, probably
unnecessary, which are given as a matter of course. 0 The rule cannot
have been an important part of control by American equity courts over
deficiency judgments and any resurrected form would be clumsy.
Deficiency judgments have recently been subjected to control by means
of the power to give or refuse confirmation of foreclosure sales. In
Suring State Bank v. Giese, 6s a Wisconsin court made cunfirmatii n
conditional upon allowance of credit for the fair value of the property,
159. Gilligan & Stem, Protecting the Rights of .1Iortgagors, X. Y. L. J., Aug. 29,
1933, p. 688, col. 1; Id., Aug. 30, 1933, p. 702, col. 1; see (1933) 47 H.%uv. L RLv. 29,
305, n. 48.
160. Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury. 91 U. S. 587, 590-91 ( 1875) ; Feltwn v. LeBretn,
92 Cal. 457, 466, 28 Pac. 490, 493 (1891) ; Chillicothe Paper Cu. v. Wheeler, t(N Ill. Al.
343, 348 (1896).
161. Bergen v. Bennett, 1 Caines Cas. 1, 19 (N. Y. 1,04); Roberts v. Flemming,
53 II. 196 (1870) ; Felton v. LeBreton, 92 Cal. 457, 4ito, 28 Pac. 4110, 493 184l1); cf.
Bennett v. Austin, 81 N. Y. 309, 327 (1880).
162. Elliot v. Wood, 45 N. Y. 71, 79 (1871) ; cf. Fulton v. Whitney, 6Vo X. Y. 543,
557 (1876).
163. Conger v. Ring, 11 Barb. 356. 360 (N. Y. 1851); 4f. Ex parte Ashley, 3 D-ae.
& C. 510, 518-19 (N. Y. 1833).
164. Pewabic Mining Co. v. Mason, 145 U. S. 349, 30-,2 (l92) ; MeNair v. Bid-
die, 8 Mo. 257, 265 (1843).
165. Trobks, MORTGAGES (3d ed. 1914) § 1044.
166. Ex parte Davis, 3 Deac. & C. 504 (N. Y. 1833) ; Gunn v. Johnston, 41 D. L. R.
656 (Alberta 1919) ; 2 CoorE, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1912) 935, 1075-70; see 25 HALsnLU-
LAWS 316 (1913).
167. Ex parte Ashley, 3 Deac. & C. 510. 518-19 (N. Y. 1834) (usual piractice though
"not absolutely necessary"); Ex parte Pedder, 3 Deac. & C. 622 (N. Y. 11,-34) (given
nuzc pro tunc).
168. 210 Wis. 489, 246 N. W. 556, 85 A. L. R. 1477, 1-1ii (1933). Wisconsin wwo
applies the doctrine where the disparity between bid and value is "shoching." \Vdmvr
v. Uthus, 217 Wis. 56, 258 N. V. 358 (1935).
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"a novel procedure for relieving mortgagors from deficiency judg-
ments."16 New Jersey inaugurated a similar practice. There, fore-
closures were prosecuted in equity after which an action at law lay for
the deficit. A statute was enacted permitting the obligor to defeat the
law action to the extent of the value of the property. Though this statute
was held invalid,170 the New Jersey equity courts carried out its purpose
by refusing to confirm sales, or reserving the right to vacate them, unless
the fair value of the property were allowed upon the mortgagee's claim.1 1'
This method is not available in New York practice where confirmation
is unnecessary 17' and delivery of a referee's deed passes immediate
title.' 73 It is makeshift in its interference with title for an ulterior pur-
pose. The stabilizing effect of the rule against setting aside the sale for
inadequacy of price alone is essential to attract bidders. And there is
no reason for refusing confirmation except on grounds that would justify
vacation of the sale. If equity has plenary jurisdiction in foreclosures,
subterfuge may be avoided by a frank assumption of power to value
the premises in measuring the claim in personam. But if the power be
assumed, the problem of appraisal remains and cannot be solved by use
of empty terms like "fair value" or "market value." The issue is essen-
tially one of balancing equities, for which ample precedent exists. Objec-
tions based upon the possibility of capricious results are directed not
against this doctrine alone but generally against discretionary power in
courts of original jurisdiction, the abuse of which is presumably cor-
rected by appellate tribunals.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Our discussion of the mortgagee's rights in personam began with the
common law. The rights and limitations which the consolidation statutes,
the emergency statutes and the permanent deficiency judgment law super-
169. See (1933) 42 YALa L. J. 960, 961.
170. Vanderbilt v. Brunton Piano Co., 111 N. J. L. 596, 169 Atd. 177, 89 A. L. I.
1080 (1933).
171. Young v. Weber, 117 N. J. Eq. 242, 175 Ati. 273 (Ch. 1934) ; see Federal Title
Mtge. Guar. Co. v. Lowenstein, 113 N. J. Eq. 200, 166 Atl. 538 (Ch. 1933); but cf.
Broadman v. Colonial Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 118 N. J. Eq. 275, 178 At. 775 (1935) (value
no defense in law action except as fixed in foreclosure). The current trend in New
Jersey is to refuse confirmation for inadequacy of bid only as to necessitous mortgagors.
And confirmation has been given on a bid for less than fair value where the discrepancy
between bid and value is not "unconscionable." See Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Ritz
Holding Co., 126 N. J. Eq. 148, 8 A. (2d) 235 (1939), (1941) 89 U. OF PA. L. RLV. 101.
172. See pp. 384-85 supra.
173. Tuthill v. Tracy, 31 N. Y. 157 (1865); Giles v. Comstock, 4 N. Y. 270 (1850)
Farell v. Noel, 17 App. Div. 319, 322, 45 N. Y. Supp. 207, 209 (1st Dep't 1897). Be.
tween sale and delivery of deed the purchaser has equitable title. Matter of Braico, 235
App. Div. 132, 256 N. Y. Supp. 483 (2d Dep't 1932), aff'd, 260 N. Y. 625, 184 N. E.
120 (1932) ; Williams v. N. Y. Zinc Co., 29 F. (2d) 167, 171 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
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imposed upon the common law gave rise, as we have seen, to certain
important problems. Conflict of laws raises several additional prcoblms
involving the requirement by the situs of leave to sue after foreclosure.
offset of value permitted by the situs, and discharge of the debt by the
law of the situs.
Before the Emergency Mortgage Laws. Generally, statutes designed
to consolidate the mortgagee's remedies have been held by fo oreign ctourts
to have no effect upon the transitory character of the mortgagee's caue
of action for the debt or balance of the debt."'4  Ccnsequently, since
Section 1078 has been held a local statute, limited to New Yotrk foore-
closure actions, leave to sue in New York for the residue of the debt
after a foreign foreclosure is not required.'7  In the absence of pr .f
to the contrary, it is assumed that the foreclosure sale was regular and
brought the fair value of the land."'h If the ohlig . r was not served.
however, the foreign foreclosure merely has the effect of establishing
the mortgagee's title to the mortgage and right to ftireclose. Perstonal
liability is not adjudicated thereby, and in a subsequent acti,,n the I. Jli., sr
may set up any defense to liability including impropriety in the fore-
closure sale.'
77
Likewise, Section 1078 has been deemed to relate solely to acticons in
New York, and thus to have no effect outside the state. In Bdlmout -,,.
Cornen,"' a Connecticut court permitted recovery of a deficit remaining
after a New York foreclosure without requiring special leave frnn the
New York court. The court denied that the New York courts had any
control over foreign actions on the theory that granting extraterritorial
effect to the New York consolidation statutes wo-iuld lead t. absurd
results." 9 For example, under the New York consolidatitin statutes an
174. See Note (1926) 42 A. L. R. 470. 480 el seq.: (lq07) 20 H.nv. L. Rrv. 32';
41 C. J. § 646-b, p. 656. For a discussion of various comparable statutes, -ce No te-; (19371
108 A. L. R. 397, (1939) 121 A. L. R. 917, 926 et seq.: Comment (1137) 25 Cutir. L.
REv. 576.
175. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Aitldn, 125 N. Y. 660, 24 N. E. 732 (S 1); Fnorida Lat'l
Holding Co. v. Burke, 135 M1isc. 341. 238 N. Y. Supp. 1 (Sup. Ct. 10291 , oiff'd, 22 9 App.
Div. 853, 243 N. Y. Supp. 799 (1st Dep't 1930) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Snith, 19 AI,.
N. C. 69 (N. Y. 1887); Cape Cod Say. Bank v. Patton, N. Y. L. J., Alr. 11, 1939, P.
1659, col. 1 (Sup. Ct.); cf. Stewart v. Eaton, 287 Mich. 4t,6, 283 N. W. 051 (14391
(comparable fichigan statute).
176. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Aitkin, 125 N. Y. 660, 675, 26 N. E. 732, 73ft (18919.
177. 'Matter of James, 146 N. Y. 78. 40 N. E. S76 (1St5); Stewart v. Eaton, 27
Mich. 466, 283 N. W. 651, 120 A. L. R. 1354, 136t6 (19391 ; see Durant v. AL ndr,4tb,
97 N. Y. 132, 141-42 (1884) ; Howard v. McNaught, 4 Wash. 355. 37 Pae. 455 (1814).
178. 48 Conn. 338 (1880).
179. For similar reasons California, which limits the right Qf a mortgagce to forc-
closure and a judgment for the deficit, refused to apply its cuns'lidati~n rcquiremvont, to.
proceedings to enforce deficits after foreigni foreclosures. Denser Sttcchyard& Banul v.
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action against a guarantor in Connecticut would be stayed by the pen-
dency of a New York foreclosure; or a mortgagee bringing actions in
New York and Connecticut on a mortgage covering property in both
states would have to obtain leave of the New York court before he
could enforce all his security. Moreover, though Connecticut practice
allowed deficiency judgments based on appraised value of the property,
the court in the Belmont case held evidence of market value incompetent
on the ground that, under New York practice, the mortgagee received
the proceeds of the foreclosure sale rather than the property itself. That
is, market value was deemed immaterial by the court, which felt that, if
it were considered, the obligor might be credited with more than the
mortgagee's actual receipts.180 Again, in Williams v. Follett,18 a mot-
gagee who had foreclosed in New York after the death of the bondsman
was permitted to file a claim in Colorado against the latter's estate with-
out obtaining special leave, on the ground that the New York statute
"applies only to actions against those who might, by virtue of the act,
be made parties to the original foreclosure proceeding."18 2 Neither case,
however, can be criticized too severely, inasmuch as a New York court
would probably, under the prevailing New York rule, have awarded the
mortgagee a judgment for the deficit shown by the sale, particularly if
the obligor were unavailable for service in the New York foreclosure. 83
Thus, it can be said that these decisions give the mortgagee no more
than was contemplated by the New York law while refusing to take
into account the accident of the defendant's whereabouts. 4
Comparable consolidation statutes outside of New York have received
various constructions. New Jersey, for one, limits the mortgagee to
foreclosure in the first instance. Within three months after foreclosure
he is permitted, on filing a notice of pendency of action, to bring an
action at law for the deficit; recovery of a money judgment reopens the
foreclosure and permits redemption within the following six months.
New Jersey, it must be noted, applies its own rule only to local mort-
Martin, 177 Cal. 223, 170 Pac. 428 (1918); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Nottingham, 18
Cal. App. (2d) 135, 63 P. (2d) 864 (1936).
180. Accord, Fidelity-Bankers Trust Co. v. Little, 178 S. C. 133, 181 S, E, 913
(1935) (Tenn. foreclosure); Howard v. McNaught, 9 Wash. 355, 37 Pac. 455 (1894)
(Kan. foreclosure).
181. 17 Colo. 51, 28 Pac. 330 (1891). Cf. Lockwood v. Fawcett, 17 Htin 146 (N, Y.
1879), cited supra note 51.
182. 17 Colo. 51, 54, 28 Pac. 330, 331 (1891).
183. But see Morgan v. Sherwood, 53 Ill. 171 (1870), where after the foreclosure of
a New York mortgage in which the mortgagor's representative was made a defendant the
filing of a claim against the estate was permitted in Illinois. Apparently, the application
of N. Y. C. P. A. § 1078 was not raised.
184. Compare Hutchinson v. Ward, 192 N. Y. 375, 380, 85 N. E. 390, 392 (1908);
Felton v. West, 102 Cal. 266, 269, 36 Pac. 676, 677 (1894).
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gages."8  Yet foreign courts have consented to apply it to New Jersey
mortgages except where both execution and place of payment were
outside New Jersey.""0 Thus, Pennsylvania has denied recovery on a
New Jersey mortgage debt where foreclosure proceedings were not first
instituted, 187 and New York has indicated its concurrence.' On the
other hand, foreign courts have not construed the California rule limiting
the mortgagee to a single action of foreclosure and deficiency judgment
as prohibiting actions for the debt before80 or during °'0 California
foreclosures or for a deficit thereafter.' Such a construction has been
justified as preventing evasion of personal liability. But if complete
relief were available in the California foreclosure through jurisdiction
in personam, there would be no excuse for entertaining another action
on the bond elsewhere, thus permitting multifariousness and a recover,
possibly in excess of that fixed by the policy of the situs.
In actions for the residue of the debt after New Jersey foreclosures.
New York has ruled that the mortgagee's failure to file a lis pendens
under the New Jersey statute does not affect the bond as a common law
185. Colton v. Salomon, 67 N. J. L. 73, 50 Atl. 5,8 (Sup. Ct. 1901). The statute is
inapplicable where the mortgage secures a note rather than a bond. Asbury Par: &
Ocean Grove Bank v. Giordano, 3 N. J. Misc. 555, 129 Atl. 202 11925), aff'd, 103 N. J.
L. 171, 134 AUt. 915 (1926).
186. Thompson v. Lakewood City Development Co., 105 Misc. 6s0, 174 X. Y. Supp.
825 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff'd, 188 App. Div. 996, 177 N. Y. Supp. 926 (2d Dep't 1919);
Hall v. Hoff, 295 Pa. St. 276, 145 AUt. 301 (1929) ; see Van Horn v. Mchmes Brick
Mfg. Co., 5 Penn. Dist. Ry. 701 (1896). But delivery of a New Jersey mortgage and
submission to New Jersey jurisdiction in foreclosure has been held to make New Jersey
law control. MeGough v. Derby, 254 App. Div. 708, 3 X. Y. S. (2d) 753 (2d Dep't
1938) ; see Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 315 (N. Y. 143); Harris v. Metropolitan
Cas. Co., 156 Misc. 692, 693, 282 N. Y. Supp. 449, 450 tMun. Ct. 1935), (193t6) 3t) CoL.
L. REv. 487.
187. Newman v. Brigantine Beach R. R., 15 Pa. Cu. Ct. t,25 (1894); see Sea Grove
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Stockton, 148 Pa. St. 14, 148-52, 23 At. 1063, 1064-(5 1892).
188. Hutchinson v. Ward, 192 N. Y. 375, 379-0. 85 N. E. 390, 391 (1908); Stump~f
v. Hallahan, 101 App. Div. 383, 386, 91 N. Y. Supp. 1062, 1063 (1st Dep't 1905), aft'd.
185 N. Y. 550, 77 N. E. 1196 (1906) ; Robinson v. Stratman, 141 Misc. 393, 252 X. Y.
Supp. 557 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (Fla. statute).
189. Maxwell v. Ricks, 294 Fed. 255 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); Mantle v. Dabney, 47
Wash. 394, 92 Pac. 134 (1907).
190. Dolbear v. Foreign Mines Devel. Co., 196 Fed. 646 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912).
191. Commercial Nat. Bank v. Catron, 50 F. (2d) 1023 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931);
Mackintosh v. Gibbs, 79 N. J. L. 40, 74 Atl. 708 (Sup. Ct. 1909), aff'd, 81 N J. L. 577,
80 AtI. 554 (1911). Contra: Lindsay v. Collings, 182 S. W. 87') (Tex. Civ. App. 1910)
(though no personal jurisdiction in California foreclosure). A Muntana statute, similar
to that of California, is given no extraterritorial effect. McGirl v. Brewer, 132 Ore. 422,
285 Pac. 208 (1930) ; Fischer v. Jackson, 239 Iil. App. 322 (1925). California has lim-
ited its statute to local foreclosures. Felton v. West, 102 Cal. 266, 36 Pac. t76 (1894);
Denver Stockyards Bank v. Martin, 177 Cal. 223, 170 Pac. 428 (1918) ; Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Nottingham, 18 Cal. App. (2d) 135, 63 P. (2d) Qt4 (1936) ; McGue v. Rommel,
148 Cal. 539, 83 Pac. 1000 (1906) ; see First Trust Bank v. Meredith, 5 Cal. (21) 214
(1936).
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obligation, though, clearly, refusal to penalize such an omission defeats
the New Jersey policy of warning purchasers that the mortgaged
premises are subject to redemption. 192  It must be noted, however, that
statutes of this type, which do not purport to discharge the debt,' should
be distinguished from other statutes providing that foreclosure exhausts
the mortgagee's remedies, 9 ' or that the mortgagee's failure to sue for
the deficit within the statutory period results in a lapse of his cause
of action.' 95 Statutes of the latter type are generally followed.
Under the Emergency Mortgage Laws. In actions brought in New
York for a debt or residue of a debt after a foreign foreclosure it has
been held that a mortgagor could not offset value under Section 1083-1.
New York holds that its emergency mortgage statutes apply only to
actions based upon local mortgages.'96 Since only local mortgages may
be foreclosed in New York and since Section 1083-b has been grouped
among the statutes regulating mortgage foreclosures, the legislature has
been regarded as thereby intending to restrict the right of offset to
New York mortgagors.197 Such a construction has also been based upon
the belief that the legislature determined an emergency to exist solely
within New York,' although it seems more likely that the legislature
gave no more thought to possible conflict of laws questions than
the gentlemen who prepare law digests without making separate pro-
vision for this subject. It is noteworthy that in the cases involving this
192. Hackensack Trust Co. v. Voigt, 75 F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) (and cases
there cited) ; Smith v. Mangin, 161 Misc. 288, 292 N. Y. Supp. 265 (Mun. Ct. 1936);
(1907) 20 HARV. L. REV. 326. The failure to file a notice of pendency of action is justi-
fied by these cases on the ground that New Jersey construes this as a requirement for
local actions. Bankers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burlingham, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 16,
1939, p. 1142, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.), indicates that a lis pendens is now a prerequisite to an
action for the residue anywhere.
193. See Weed v. Caulkins, 24 Hun 582, 585 (N. Y. 1881).
194. Cape Cod Say. Bank v. Patton, N. Y. L. J., Apr. 11, 1939, p. 1659, cot. 1 (Sup.
Ct.) (mortgagee failed to show effect of Massachusetts non-judicial foreclosure on right
to deficiency); Gates v. Tebbetts, 100 Mo. App. 590, 75 S. W. 169 (1903); Battle v.
Battjes, 274 Mich. 267, 264 N. W. 367 (1936); c. Denistoun v. Payne, 7 La. An. 333
(1852).
195. McGough v. Derby, 254 App. Div. 708, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 753 (2d Dep't 1938);
Wollen v. David, Inc., 247 App. Div. 113, 286 N. Y. Supp. 289 (1st Dep't 1936), aff'd,
272 N. Y. 626, 5 N. E. (2d) 364 (1936).
196. See, generally, Bailey & Rice, The Extraterritorial Effect of the New York Mort-
gage Moratorium (1935) 20 CORN. L. Q. 315; (1940) 40 COL. L. RF. 867.
197. Provident Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Steinmetz, 270 N. Y. 129, 200 N. E. 669
(1936); Integrity Trust Co. v. Posch, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 973 (City Ct. 1939); Keeler
v. Templeton, 164 Misc. 113, 298 N. Y. Supp. 193 (Sup. Ct. 1937) ; see cases cited illra
note 199; (1940) 40 CoL L. Ray. 867, 869;. but cf. Fromm v. Glueck, 161 Misc. 502, 293
N. Y. Supp. 530 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (set-off governed by forum).
198. Franklin Soc. v. Weseman, 162 Misc. 109, 293 N. Y. Supp. 909 (Mun. Ct.
1937), ibid, 170 Misc. 1000, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 247 (Mun. Ct. 1937); General Bond &
Mtge. Co. v. Yaffe, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 9, 1935, p. 1772, cot. 6 (Sup. Ct.); Bailey & Rice,
loc. cit. supra note 196.
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issue either no provision had been made at the situs for offset or statutcs
giving such a right had been held invalid.1 But cases are beginning to
arise in New York in which extra-state mortgage statutes are being
pleaded. New York has already given effect to a foreign discharge and
there are indications that it will enforce an offset validly created by the
law of the situs.'Oe
Professor Lorenzen has pointed out that moratory legislation can lie
effective only if, under a doctrine of reciprocity, a moratorium at the
situs is recognized wherever the litigation takes place. -"  His suggcStilon
is reinforced today by an increasing tendency to enact permanent mort-
gage legislation designed to prevent a mortgagee's recovery, in rem and
in personam, in excess of the debt. Unless regulations of the situs are
enforced at the place of litigation - whether they involve offset of value
in an action for the residue of the debt or limitations on the right to
sue-the state denying enforcement becomes a haven for litigati.n
which is suppressed, at least in part, by the policy of the situs and invitt,
a similar repudiation of its own policy. The few cases decided thus
far indicate that New York, for one, will enforce an offset granted in
another situs. But this is insufficient, even if followed elsewhere, t..
effectuate the policy of the New York statutes.2 2 For if a New Yorh
foreclosure is obtained without personal jurisdiction, an action will lie
in a foreign state for the difference between the amount of the obli-
gation and the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, without adjustment
for fair value.0 3 The only check on such an excessive recovery is the
requirement of leave to sue imposed by Section 1078. If this statute
is now disregarded as a local restriction on the "right to sue" or as an
impotent effort to control foreign actions, as was held in Belmont v.
Cornea, it is quite obvious that the policy of New York will be defeated.
199. See Hackensack Trust Co. v. Voigt, 75 F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A. 2, 1935); Porte
v. Polachek, 150 'Misc. 891, 270 N. Y. Supp. 807 (Mlun. Ct. 1934) ; Calvosa v. De Luc.f,
N. Y. L. J., June 6, 1935, p. 2927, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.); Bankers Loan Co. v. Whitcomnb,
N. Y. L. J., Mar. 9, 1938, p. 1166, col 3 (Sup. CL).
200. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Silbert, N. Y. L. J., July 8, 1939, p. 59, col. 5 (Sup.
CL), aff'd, 260 App. Div. 1002, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 999 (ist Dep't 104U I; se Lnailr;
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Burlingham, N, Y. L. J., Oct. 16, 1939, p. 1142, c,A. 4 :Sup.
Ct.); cf. Franklin Soc. v. Weseman, 170 Misc. 1000, 1002, 10 N.Y. S. (2d) 247, 259
(Mun. Ct. 1939); Porte v. Polachek, 150 Misc. 891, 894, 270 N. Y. Supp. 1U17, ,-lW
(Mun Ct. 1934).
201. Moratory Legislation Relating to Bills and Arotes and the Conflict of Lows
(1919) 28 YALE L. J. 324, 351.
202. In Bayside-Flushing Gardens, Inc. v. Beuermann, 36 F. Supp. 76 (D. D. C.
1941), an action brought on a New York mortgage bond, defendant's answer Ectting up
an offset of value was stricken out. The decision that N. Y. C. P. A. § 1033-b is "pro-
cedural" overlooks the distinction between the use of this term in constitutional law awl
conflict of laws. See Bailey & Rice, supra note 196, at 31A et seq,
203. N. Y. C. P. A. § 1083-b, permitting offset of value in an action un the ddbt, EL
inapplicable to post-moratorium mortgages.
